


Capitalism, Communism And the Evolution Of Civilization



John Landon

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1848+: Theory, Ideology, And Revolution

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Preface

This is a short 'netbook' written ca. 2008 as a set of webpages in book form using the old Microsoft Publisher. It is the source, or at least inspiration, for the book **Last and First Men: 1848+: Capitalism, Communism and the End of History** (2014, available in print and two Kindle formats: text, and illustrated) and is a very brief introduction to an ideological interpretation of the 'eonic effect', that pattern of epochal transformations across history. That pattern gives us a new insight into modernity as a kind 'new age' in world history and in that context, we get a new insight into the dynamic behind revolution. This a lightweight consideration of the democratic revolutions and emergent socialism as related in the emergence of modernity, or, here, the modern transition. The term 'discrete freedom sequence' attempts to consider the way democracy emerges twice inside intervals of transition. The issue of darwinism taken up in a critique. The so-called 'eonic effect' suggests a more general form of evolutionary dynamic.

The text also includes an archive of posts from the blog Darwiniana (at darwiniana.com) mostly on the so-called 'red forty-eight group' In addition there is selection from **Last and First Men**, and an outline of history from **World History and The Eonic Effect**.

Introduction

One of the unexpected successes of the eonic model is the way it highlights the rise of modernity in the context of an historical dynamic, visible in the eonic effect. This model allows us to harmonize the ideas of history and evolution, and mediate the contradiction between random and teleological conceptions applied to history. The discovery of historical directionality where least expected is a by-product of eonic periodization, and the result is the depiction of the modern transition, and just as important, its 'Great Divide', or the point at which the modern transition terminates and yields to the new age of modernity as such. This property of a discrete-continuous model, its finite interval transformations in a series, finds a surprising confirmation in the facts of world history, concluding with the modern transition, the extraordinary period of innovation that we see in the early modern and up to the end of the eighteenth century. The model distinguishes carefully between the so-called macro and micro levels of the eonic sequence, and this, applied to the modern transition and its aftermath, suddenly uncovers the enigma of modernity in its often confusing and seemingly contradictory aspects: after the divide period, the action changes its character from macro to micro. The transitional interval from ca. 1500 to 1800, from the Reformation to the Enlightenment, is climaxed by the generation of the French, American, and Industrial Revolutions, and a host of other so-called 'eonic emergents', and the result is a spectacular take-off point, the generation leading up to the period of the transformed mid-nineteenth century world of liberal/bourgeois civilization. It is important to be wary of simplistic generalizations and to be alert to a system that is beyond simple causality in the interaction of macro determination and free agency. The period of the early modern ends with a divide point and this in a massive cluster from ca. 1750 to 1850, the Great Divide, are an aspect of the 'non-random (eonic) evolution' of civilization. This is, at first, surprising, and a strange way to analyze both history and modernity, but the match of the model to the facts is so striking that we gradually begin to get a sense of a tremendously subtle and deep system at work, one that resolves the chronic confusions of historical

determinism and free history that have bedeviled all efforts to construct universal histories. Even if one found the eonic model a bit odd it would be worth one's while to get this kind of analysis under one's belt, because this kind of systems analysis, however outlandish at first, uncovers something less organized approaches would miss completely.

The appendix of World History and The Eonic Effect constructs a periodization database using a special terminology, and in this context the term '1848+' is simply one way of referring to the Great Divide period, or rather its immediate aftermath, clearly visible in the generation of the 1840's and after. This period is, ironically, the theatre of one of the classic failed revolutions, that of 1848, but one that left a mysterious question mark, and thus the 1848+ glyph is a topical notation serving to force a question on us: how should we take the phenomenon of revolution, and ideology, in the context of the eonic model. More generally we should look at the whole outcome of the modern transition in its many dimensions and the way the nineteenth century comes to floodtide at the onset of globalization. The generation of the 48's shows a host of other parallel incidents of interest, but we can focus on the moment of emergent Marxism at the conclusion to the modern transition.

Actually, while most so-called scientific approaches to history attempt to ape the objectivity of the hard sciences even as they end in ideological bias, the eonic model makes no pretense to transcend ideology, doing ideology wholesale, and keeps itself honest by forcing the issue of looking at the full spectrum of ideologies. The Axial Age alone shows us a multiplicity of differing perspectives and views on a stupefying scale, each hard to fully understand without a full-scale scholarly expedition. Thus, we can optionally as an exercise of post-eonic analysis) actively reconstruct the classic collision of liberal and post-liberal ideologies as this occurred instantly in the wake of the French Revolution, hoping to find some tactic of reconciliation between them, and some resolution of the immense tragedy of liberal capitalism emerging from leftist promotion of revolutionary adventurism. We should note at once, without conservative or reactionary bias, that the eonic model puts a high premium on basic liberalism as an eonic emergent process, and the reason for this is that it correlates exactly with the eonic structure, and cascades with the coming of the multiple democratic revolutions that proceeded in parallel to the leftist 'deviations' attempting spastically to both fulfill them and overcome them. Marx or no Marx, the liberal revolutions outstripped their far leftist competitors, for reasons not hard to uncover, given a little eonic study. But it is important to consider that the endgame comes at the end and that the challenge from the left seeded a potential that will bear fruit in a new future. And the tragedy of liberalism was the way its capitalist factor usurped the democratic potential and this led very logically to a socialist challenge.

Liberal emergentism has solid roots in the seventeenth century, and crystallizes rapidly in the so-called Great Divide. It is important to consider the marxist analysis of the 'bourgeois revolution', to study the English Civil War and the cooptation of the period of the Restoration. That said, there is nothing mysterious in the basic impulse of the nineteenth century left: democracy means just that, how to bring 'real democracy' into existence? Thus, the rise of the left is simply an aspect of one and the same liberal revolution, a point often lost in the fractious dialectic it generated. By the time this impulse reaches the throes of Leninism the point has been lost totally, and the basics of liberal emergentism look

to have been right from the beginning. The basic problem is that while the eonic sequence looks to be 'revolutionary' indeed, the series of eonic transitions are not the same as 'revolutions', which are particular historical episodes that occur in the context of eonic transformation, but don't represent its essential dynamics. Thus, the specter of teleological revolutionism arose as a fallacy of eonic dynamics, and the result was a misconception of the case at hand.

Of essential interest is the now classic set of antitheses that emerge between the liberal and later leftist, especially Marxist, perspectives. It was Marx who first clearly outlined the issues of theory and ideology, in the context of revolutionary transformation and its dilemmas. And yet something has always seemed 'not right' about Marxist theory and the tremendous surging emergence of liberal civilization was never properly analyzed or resolved in the tenets of the suddenly-itself-an-ideology: the Marxist interpretation of historical dynamics. Historical materialism is a kind of deterministic theory beyond free agency.

The eonic model forces a kind of 'recompute' on these questions, since it makes a strong, and finally much better, claim on historical theory than the heavy-footed 'historical materialism', whose analyses have never been successful in their theoretical claims, what to say of their fallacious attempts to rationalize the phenomenon of revolution, witness the fiasco of the Bolshevik revolution and its aftermath.

The eonic model, it must be admitted, with whatever bias, gives a much sounder analysis of so-called 'bourgeois modernity', but perhaps risks the danger of itself being ideological in this respect. In fact, the model is so comprehensive that it can table contradictions with ease, and its intent is reconstructive study, not ideological promotion. But the leftist rejection of bourgeois capitalism led to the rejection, in some respects, of the whole phenomenon of modernity itself, in the confusion of economic and cultural categories, thus ending in a kind of proto-postmodern muddle of trying to undo the very culture it was trying to promote. The crux of the confusion lies in the mis-analysis of the French Revolution, and the so-called 'economic interpretation of history' applied to the dynamics of capitalism. The irony here is that by putting the prime emphasis on economic dynamics the Marxist left ended by strengthening the very process it attempted to critique. Whatever else is the case, and beyond the phantoms of theory, the left, the issue of revolution apart, provided an answer to the deficit of democracy in its successful practical realization of nineteenth century labor movements attempting to redress the imbalance not only in bourgeois democracy but in the whole history of exploitation visible since the emergence of the first states at the dawn of civilization. A world-historical first.

The eonic model approaches the whole question of the failed theses of historical materialism with a different construct and in a much simpler and more intuitive fashion, by distinguishing economic 'evolution' from the greater 'evolution' of culture, and demotes capitalism to economics, even as it promotes the more general phase of modernity to the level of a kind of macrohistorical dynamic. Demoting capitalism to 'mere economics' shouldn't be a controversial step! Cats belong in the feline category, nowhere else. And yet the mystique of capitalism seems to have bemused the Marxist to the point that universal history is seen as the product of economic interactions, and this is simply a fallacy.

1.1 Marx, Darwin, And Ideology: the question of theory and ideology...

One of the great ironies of modern thought is the way that economic ideology came to influence biological theory, even as Marx was developing a critique of just such ideological confusion. As a final confusion, the left itself ended by embracing Darwinism, blunting the cogency of its assessment of the impact of economic ideology on culture. Part of the reason for this lies in the Feuerbachian agenda of secularist Marxism, and the challenge it brings to the reactionary character of religion. But as the history of Darwinism shows this secularist strain of modern thought has not produced a truly adequate understanding of the issues of religion.

As we examine the capitalist revolution in the context of the eonic effect we can see the rightness in Marx's instinctive sense, based for example on his thinking about Ricardo, that theories were adopting the stance of science even as they expressed a kind of bias about the systems they purported to analyze. The insight that Marx was groping toward arises all over again in the eonic model, but in a different way, and almost automatically from the way that model distinguishes the modern transformation from the elements, or 'eonic emergents', that constitute its action. Thus, the Industrial Revolution becomes a characteristic emergent timed to the transition itself, but it is not itself open to equation with that process, save perhaps that it stole the show. It is a set of technical processes matched with a set of ideas about how economies should function. All well and good, but the theoretical component of some economic determinism is off the mark here in a way the eonic model compensates for on the spot with its distinction of 'system action' and 'free action'. An economic system is thus not a pure system following some set of differential equations, but a dual combination of agents making economic policies and the system that arises from those decisions. The evidence is clear: a set of policies comes into existence to express market dynamics as a reform of policy, and from there a kind of bubble world of economic consequences comes to the fore as a world in itself, to which all are subject, soon with the claim that this is the 'way things are, and so must be'. That's the gist, or one way of stating Marx's challenge to ideology. That such a system is actually the creation of the agents themselves, or those agents in control of capital, is long forgotten in the stance of 'alienation' that arises.

In the eonic model the functioning of economic systems is segregated from the more general flux of eonic emergents, and it focuses directly on the moment that agents of philosophy bring to the point of system creation: Adam Smith is the all-time classic example. This is expressed in the phrase econostream != eonic sequence in the material of eonic model. The appearance of Adam Smith is, or tokens, one of the classic emergent strains of the modern period, but the realization of his thinking becomes a dominant discourse on its own terms in a way that throws the diversified dialectic of modernist thought into an imbalance of economic philosophies whose potential cannot be generalized to the expression of universal histories. Suffice it to say, the thinking of Adam Smith becomes distorted as a kind of fetish of theory and is soon a format for 'reality dogmatism', claims about the way things are, and hence must be.

It is remarkable to note how this ideological flu is catching, and it seems to enter the stage of biological theory formation just in the generation of Darwin's production of his theory. Another component to this crystallizing set of fallacies springs from Malthus, and the debate over his ideas (even

as his demographic contributions prove seminal abstractions in the creation of demographic science) had from the beginning an ideological focus.

The resulting theory of natural selection produced by Wallace and Darwin both proved a disguised version of this Smithian/Malthusian legacy, and the resemblance of selectionist theory to the strain of mantra-chanting on the subject of economic competition seems no accident. The fallacy arises from the failure to actually observe evolutionary dynamics in action. It is one thing to discover evolution as a set of facts, quite another to fully observe its dynamics, and here the Malthusian surface of the survival of the fittest scenes directly observed by naturalists, Wallace in his jungles, Darwin in his Galapagos, is actually misleading. They are observing 'evolution' of a sort, but never the real dynamics of evolution as such. This point is forever unclear until we actually produce an example of evolutionary dynamics, at which point the vast complexity of its real action can be observed as if for the first time.

In any case, the resemblance of Smithian to Darwinian thinking is striking, down to the obsessive treatments of ethics seen in the almost willful attempts to promote 'selfishness' isms as the basis for evolutionary ethics, the reductionist scenarios essentially voiding ethical action as they ground altruism, for example, in a trick reversal of selectionist reasoning. A true tour de force of ideology, one they got away with because, just as Marx might have predicted, they made it look like science. The subtle trashing of altruism and the subtle promotion of selfishness, a qualitative switch so desirable for those promoting capitalist participation, is one of the most dangerous legacies of Darwinism, thence of the legacy of Adam Smith, whose thinking was not intended by him for these outcomes. To fritter away the immense potential of modernity on these mathematicized card tricks of scientism puts a whole civilization at risk, and Marx and his contemporaries in timely fashion sound the first warning.

1.2 A Revolution of The Ages

The preoccupation of the nineteenth century left was the issue of revolution, and especially the ambiguous outcome of the French Revolution. The question of counterrevolution and the sense of the 'revolution manqué' that arose in the wake of the French explosion generated what we know of as the modern 'far left'. The acute sense of the dynamics of class that haunted first the French, then the later July and '48 eruptions are what led Marx to his classic analyses of class struggle. The aftershocks of the French Revolution are strewn across the nineteenth century and we see especially in the generation of Marx the emergence of a 'diagnosis' of the outcome of modern revolutionary democracy in terms of an analysis of the class polarization of the new political systems attempting to be born, as often stillborn, beside the instant success of the relatively isolated American Revolution that had set the tone for the emergence of the wave of democratization associated with the Great Divide.

The point for us is to stand back and look at the modern transition itself, from the sixteenth century to the Enlightenment as the 'revolutionary' transformation it essentially was, without becoming fixated on the incidents of revolution themselves. If we do this we see that the Marxist analysis tends to miss the larger dynamics of modernism, which encompasses not only a remarkable string of actual revolutions, but an entire transformation of culture that is far larger than the politics of revolution as such. The explosion of the Reformation, its synchronous companion, the German social revolution of

1615, the English Civil War, long precede, yet clearly prophecy what is to come in the American and French Revolutions.

The point for us is that the sense of a new era in history that so animates Marxist thought, and not only Marxist thought, is confirmed by the evidence given in the spectacle of the rise of modernity itself, at a level deeper than the incidents of actual revolution. This 'revolution of the ages' comprises much more than the confusing and contingent circumstance of the French Revolution, whose dynamics induced a schematism of thought leading to the fallacies of revolutionary adventurism. This schematism resulted in the dubious, if not fallacious, view that the explosive drama of revolution constituted the prima face evidence of historical dynamics, and that therefore the controlled induction of revolutions according to script would constitute a realization of that dynamic. Unfortunately, as the Bolshevik revolution shows, this line of thinking contains somewhere a set of false assumptions. The suddenly appearing ideology of revolution has been the object of multiple critiques, some of them quite cogent, others too ideologically biased to grasp the real issues. But the simplest first conclusion of our differing analysis would be to note that in one way Marx and his fellows got it right, in one way: the modern transition produced a spectrum of bourgeois economic societies, struggling toward democracy, at which point, and here Marxists tend to have gotten it wrong, the transition impetus waned and the system in question lapsed into a strange kind of equilibrium not easily induced to further revolutionary change. The false analysis of Fukuyama and his sausage of Hegel unwittingly gave expression to this view, in another way. This is the stuck in gear 'bourgeois world' of the Marxist critique. The problem here, and prolonged study of the eonic effect might bring the point home, is simple: there is no logical prohibition on revolution, but in practice no such venture can mimic the spectacular scale of the modern transition itself, whose emergentist character is almost mysterious in its depth. It seems so broad that in fact it is a poor description to reduce it to the categorization of 'bourgeois society'. The result of the modern transformation includes religious transformations, the rise of science, a definite set of philosophic innovations, and a broad cultural flowering encompassing all fields, including the artistic. The later left ended thus in a condition of jackknifing exception to the civilization coming into existence, thus condemning itself to bucking the larger momentum of modernity with an ambitious hope to produce an artificial course correction applied to that momentum. Marxists often said as much, in their own language, and their ambivalence toward the outcome of modernity is fairly well recorded in their literature. It is small wonder that the collision proved disastrous in its failure to grapple with the phenomenon it thought it had understood in purely economic terms. This then is the problem with revolutions: it is true that revolutions correlate with modernity, but they don't define it. To construct a new 'new society', a new variant of modernity, just after a new society has just come into existence creates a collision of modernity with itself. And the logistics of social change required to do that are so far beyond the means of a cadre of revolutionaries as to constitute a practical, if not logical, fallacy. That is obvious if we look at the artificiality of Bolshevism: a group of agents who had lost perspective on what they were doing, and had an instant confrontation with a series of 'black boxes', social complexes hard to even describe let alone modify, whose correct grasp is not easy even for hordes of scientifically trained sociologists, what to say of 'movement enthusiasts' too often armed with little more than a set of eclectic clichés of social theory. And yet the mystery remains that the modern transformation does show clear evidence of the sudden (over several centuries, and relative to the scale of world history) transformation over this total spectrum of culture that revolutionaries observed after the fact but couldn't replicate. So, at least, it is not true necessarily that notions of 'revolution' are to be replaced by notions of 'slow evolutionary change'. It is simply that we don't understand and can't replicate what we

see as the natural process of history, so far. The simplest resolution of all this would have been (and Marx all too often sensed this point himself) to have ridden the momentum of the bourgeois emergentism with a practical effort to produce a better version of democracy after the fashion of the cascade of such. In fact, a close look shows that this was essentially the real meaning of the whole 'socialist' conception, as this arose as a version of the attempt to define the term 'democracy', so recently reborn, and too swiftly compromised by the complexities of class dynamics, to the point that in the view of leftist hotheads the whole outcome was flawed or inadequate, or dominated by what turned out to be the prodigious momentum of the capitalist sideshow, soon the main event. Here Marx was a victim of his own Hegelian brilliance, with his classic critique of the doctrine of Right. That famous turning point in the Hegelian aftermath issued a challenge to the fundamentals of democratic constructivism in its experimental phases. But the point was lost that without a system of rights, the first born of the political transformation of modernity, all subsequent experiments in social tinkering were going to be orphans of the democratic emergentism of the whole transition. Here the later left, a la Marx, entered uncharted terrain, with the disastrous results we see in the contemptuous and totally eviscerating versions propounded by Leninists, whereby the great and historic victories of 'right' were discarded in the stages of the socialist parody.

The issue thus is posed: what is the modern transition, and how are we to understand it in larger terms against the backdrop of world history? For that we need to extend our analysis by looking at the whole evolution of civilization as such by moving backwards, there to find the first of a series of 'revolutions of the ages', the so-called Axial Age period.

None of this is a rejection of the idea of revolution, as such, however perilous such thinking now vitiated by false concepts, and the chronic and somehow terminally confused debate such as we see in the Second Internationale over the question, the Bernsteins vs the Leninists. Lest we lose perspective and take sides too easily in that prolonged fracas, they both seemed right and wrong at once, let us recall that the American Revolution was just that, a revolution, and that its success lay in its ability to reprogram something from scratch after a revolutionary interruption of continuity. How they brought it off remains one of the mysteries of world history, highlighted by its eonic bull's eye timing at the Great Divide, even as the facts are recorded in a transparent chronicle, but one thing is clear: they didn't waste time on theories. Their devices were practical nostrums of constructivist republicanism. What we see later is the concoctions of scientism concocted by cadres suffering Hegelian brain damage resulting in a tragicomedy of agents who had no idea of what they were doing. These tragedies of theory spring from the loss of a sense of universal history and the failure to grapple the idea of freedom in relation to those orphans of science we call (social) theories.

1.3 The Eonic Effect

Here we can connect our discussion with the larger issue of the eonic effect, and the historical dynamics discovered behind the emergence of civilization since the Neolithic. The core discovery here is of the so-called Axial Age, the phenomenon of synchronous emergentism we see in classical antiquity, including the five, or more, parallel emergentist zones of cultural transformation stretching across Eurasia. Here the Marxist theory of history confronts a wild exception to the claims of purely economic interpretations of the evolution of culture. In fact, we see prime examples of the transformational process connected with the broadest issues of culture, from religion to the political, from the

philosophical to the aesthetic. The full description of the Axial period has been described in these blogbooks from several different aspects. Here we might note that Marx had a sense, which he misconceived, of a progression of ages, e.g. in his conception of the stage of development from feudalism to capitalism. The problem with his analysis is that the 'stage' of modernity does not exactly match the passage from feudalism to capitalism. Modernity is not described exactly as the 'stage' of capitalism, and the incidence of feudal situations is far-flung, that is, it appears, and recurs, at many times and places, throwing some doubt on the 'stage' aspect of its appearance.

In fact, as the example of Axial period shows, we find a pure 'stage' of something that is independent of its economic arrangements. The enigma of the Axial Age resolves itself into the need for a larger generalization, since its uniqueness as a period, indeed, a stage, suggests that it is only one in a series. With that insight, we rapidly solve the puzzle of 'stages' as we move backwards and forwards from the Axial interval, suddenly to discover that a series of Axial intervals, the birth of civilization (so-called), the Axial period proper, and the rise of modernity, fall into a sequential pattern of emergent acceleration. We have the clue to the rise of the modern, and an equal clue to where the Marxist analysis is off the mark. Our stages are real, as temporal phases of acceleration, but have no intrinsic content, or defining label. That is, there is one field of civilization, or Civilization differentiated as 'civilizations' (it comes to the same thing), and the stages are an 'intensification' of their inherent processes, cultural, religious, political. We must examine the content transformed in each case empirically. All at once, the simplicity of the situation is brought home by the comprehensive nature and visibility of this set of transitions, dubbed the 'eonic sequence'. The puzzle of capitalism confused with modernity clarifies at once. The economic stream, already semi-capitalist, enters the transitional zone and period interval, and we see a correlated transformation we call the 'industrial revolution', and the onset of modern capitalism. The revolutionary transformation of economic systems that we see in the modern transition has been confused with the transition itself. In fact, the question of capitalism has no intrinsic connection to modernity, for the very simple reason that it is present, in primitive forms, across the whole of history in the form of 'market behaviors' and 'market systems' (always present whatever the state of social interventionism cast out by the very late Adam Smith). Thus, the issue of Marx can be simply restated very simply as a challenge to the question of markets and human rights, in the emergence of laissez-faire systems in the context of overall modernity. Nothing could be simpler in principle, nor as vexatious in practice, since the triggering process is one thing, the outcome highly rooted in its own circumstance, and not easily changed. The need to differentiate economic systems from the 'eonic system' lies in the fact that markets are omnipresent, and spread to all places at all times, while the eonic sequence is a localized intermittent sequence of isolated effects.

But in essence the point is clear, as noted already: as the forms of economic development emerge across world history, their actuality is independent of the eonic sequence itself, and thus require the deliberation of economic reasoning in each context where they occur. The notion of 'free markets' is thus an abstraction of later theorists who attempt to apply a canon of policy concepts to the prior stream of semi-capitalist perhaps semi-mercantilist or 'what have you' behaviors. All this means is that the outcome as capitalism that we see in modern times is distinct from the stage of modernity itself, logically speaking, notwithstanding its center-stage claim on the title of modern social systems.

The question of theory then suddenly jumps to a new and different mode: that of the progression of accelerations or transitions so mysteriously present along a selective mainline of universal cultural history.

It seems as if, so far from being a stage of history, the capitalist phase of modern history is a relatively contingent aspect of that modernity, suddenly amplified in the process of modernization and technological discovery, but not in and of itself an intrinsic stage of anything. We have simply restated a Marxist thesis in another form: we are not required to posit an inevitable stage of economic existence on the grounds that is connected to the larger eonic sequence of emerging civilization. There may be solid grounds for embracing a capitalist brand of economic organization, but that is not the point. There is no inherent historical inevitability to its appearance. And in fact, its appearance is actually a relatively arbitrary set of variants decided on by historically given agents, often ideological agents at heart. There is hardly any way around this fact. Would we define modernity in terms of one capitalist system, as opposed to any number of easily conceived variants? What are we talking about?

It is almost as if Marx had been saying: we see the modern transition suddenly frozen in place and left incomplete as it is captured by the forms of a particular stage of 'capitalist' economic formation. There must be a completed form of modernity itself that is realizable as post-capitalist. That may be true or not, but we can see that the basic point is clear: the dynamics of world history we have found is compatible with multiple alternate forms of economic organization. Especially important to grasp is that the self-organization, so-called, visible in economic prosperity generation is a sui generis process. It only explains itself, and is not the right rubric of explanation/theory required to understand the larger dynamics of Civilization. Once we become familiar with this kind of analysis the point is almost obvious. And yet versions of the notion of economic self-organization have tended to sow tares across the board in all areas of social analysis, indeed, including the biological, notably the brand of evolutionism that emerged from the Darwinian phase. The idea, seen a figure such as Hayek, that social institutions in the manner of 'self-organization' in relation to economic systems, is certainly false. The evolution of social organizations springs from many sources, the generative action of the eonic sequence claiming by far the largest component of that action. And its relationship to economic systems is not intrinsic.

1.4 The Riddle of Evolution

One episode of the ideological drama of Marxism lay in its reckoning with the coming of Darwinism, especially in the formulations of Engels. Marxists seemed to think that while Darwinism gave an account of biological evolution, Marxism was better equipped to deal with the cultural. In fact, we have already seen the inadequacy of both approaches, and what is more we have discovered a form of historical dynamics on such a vast scale that its implications force us to reckon with the scale of general evolution itself. Thus, the sense of leftist thinkers that they were grappling with evolution in some way is confirmed and yet we can see that a different formulation, such as we see in the eonic analysis, in fact foots the bill much better. We have essentially found one key to the dynamics of civilizations and their economies, and in the process, to what is at first our sense of puzzlement, we come to the realization that what we have found must impinge on the riddle of human evolution as such. We can hardly take Darwinian oversimplifications seriously if we have found 'evolution' in history itself, with a suspicion that what we see in some form that we do not yet understand must apply to the earlier stages of human evolution. That is to say, some form of 'macro' dynamics ought to have been present from the earliest

phases of human emergence. We don't need to jump to conclusions here, but what we can say is that the misapplication of Darwinism to history is exposed for what it is, a kind of ideological manipulation of something we see to be far more complex. The relationship of evolution to history requires the mediation of a new kind of historical model, and this can help us to put the fallacies, not of Adam Smith, who was an honest economist, but of his biological successors, into context as inadequate to either historical or evolutionary theory.

1.5 An Eonic Model

Here we can inject a reference to the eonic model, as this formalizes in an elegant, and ultimately very simple, way the basic facts of the eonic effect, as a series of three (or more) transitions in a mainline called the eonic sequence. The model arises from a clear examination of the Axial Age and the requirements for an adequate analysis of its enigma. The resolution lies in the formulation of the idea of an eonic sequence, whose set of transitions, or accelerations, demands two levels of analysis. We derive the model from an interesting question: when did evolution stop and history begin? The answer to this paradox is that no instantaneous transition would be possible, instead nature would demand a Transition between the two. We can apply the same logic to that Transition: would one such transition do the job? No, in fact we see the form of the Transition would be a series of such transitions in a series in which the balance of evolutionary and history aspects would shift their mix. Most remarkably that is what we see in the eonic effect, and the result is a model on two levels, the macro and the micro. The macro shows 'high level' determination, and the micro is the realization aspect in its wake. This gives us a rough model of the Axial, and other, 'axial', transitions.

This analysis on two levels resolves at a stroke the confusions of the Axial period: we see the macro effect in the sudden eruption of effects, the micro aspect in the actual way each transitional area undergoes realization in a differentiated spectrum. The hopeless muddle of the Old Testament clarifies, since we can see the braided macro and micro effects. The Axial component, as pure timing, indicates the macro, the actual form of the Old Testament myth representing the micro. That the Old Testament is a micro description of a macro process its observers did not properly understand at once clarifies the historical result we see.

In general, the clearest picture of the process is to be had from its best documented instance, the Archaic/Classical phase of the Greek Axial interval, surely the most spectacular moment of civilizational acceleration given to us by historiography and archaeology. The diversity of the whole Axial spectrum requires emphasis. Two religions are born, in Israel, and India, a whole series of philosophical, political, artistic, and other innovations, appear as if like clockwork, and then the process subsides and goes into steady state, more or less. Our next realization is that the clue to the whole has fallen into our lap and we extend this analysis, using the discrete-continuous interpretation, to a plain vanilla cyclical analysis based on a sequence of transitions: the birth of civilization (actually the point of the emergence of Sumer and Dynastic Egypt), the Axial interval as such, and the suddenly emergent modernity we see as the modern transition. The idea of a model can allow us to realize, and get used to, such an outlandish, at first, form of analysis, by formalizing on a 'take it or leave it' basis: that is, we can simply try this approach as formal modeling, until such time as its basic rightness begins to sink in.

A considerable list of accessory concepts is required here, and we might note two: the idea of a frontier effect, and the idea of relative transforms, or the 'stream and sequence' concept. Our eonic sequence follows a simple logic: that of globalization, eonic globalization, and we see that our eonic sequence at each stage is moving to a new frontier zone of realization, in the oikoumene field of its prior manifestation. This resolves the puzzle of the sudden 'restart' in a minor Canaanite area on the boundaries of the Sumerian/Egyptian fields. This effect is essential for understanding the rise of modernity with its European polarization, and vulnerability to Eurocentric confusions, which are destined to be transient side effects of the larger eonic sequence, which proceeds independently of the individual civilizations it touches. The question of relative transforms is essential logic needed to grasp the way in which two levels operate in tandem. We see that the Axial interval seems to generate, e.g. monotheism, while at one and the same time 'monotheism' existed, or was developing, prior to the Axial interval. This non-puzzle is instantly clarified by a version of a discrete-continuous model, in which we take the 'stream' of culture, or cultures, on one level, and the overlaid 'sequence' effect of the larger macro process together as two aspects of a master system. The rough elegance of this systematic braiding of the evolutionary and the historical is first seen in its prodigious glory in the earlier, especially Axial, periods, and gives a new perspective on the rise of the modern: it is a transition in a series, follows the logic of frontier effects, and shows one and the same 'stream and sequence' overlay found in the other cases. This macro and micro aspect of the modern transition, with the consequent devolution to micro in the wake of the Great Divide, followed by the phase of globalization, allows us to see together the confusion of liberal and post-liberal systems that we have discussed from the start. It is very disconcerting to Eurocentric fans of the modern transition to watch this globalization of their transient localization start its prodigious globalization, almost like clockwork, in the wake of the eonic sequence. The timely appearance of the types such as Karl Marx is thus seen for what it is. Their ambivalence toward the basic liberal emergentism is suddenly understandable, and yet ominous in its potential for deviation from the suddenly crystallized version of the mainline.

The relationship of localization, as a set of transitions in the eonic sequence, and their contribution and subsequent globalization in a set of oikoumenes or diffusion fields, and globalization, is the most confusing aspect of the eonic effect (the modern transition is not a question of Europe!), and yet once mapped out the process is remarkably simple. And in that context, we can come to an understanding of the emergent left of the nineteenth century. It is almost uncanny to see how a remorphing of liberalism, a prime emergent process of the modern transition, moves to respond to the process of economic globalization. Nothing in our eonic model says anything about what occurs outside of its mainline. Thus, the moment of the divide, the termination of the eonic action, is open to deviation and chaotification, and the substitution of quite different processes for the general direction set by the eonic interval. This issue particularly clarifies the ambiguity of the globalization era of the modern post-transition, at once an active diffusionism of modernist elements, and a protest against Eurocentrism and imperialistic economism. The timely appearance of an agency of globalization, visible in the Marxist response to modernity and globalizing economism, is almost miraculous and the undoubted reason for the mystique of the left, whatever the confusions of its ideological crystallization.

But eonic analysis pushes us at once to compensate for the inadequacies of Marxist thinking. We should extend our analysis to the broadest categories, e.g. an idea of the 'eonic left', or the transformational character of the whole eonic series, beginning with the emergence of civilizations and states and the dramas and spectacles of equalization visible in the action of the eonic effect. Here the basic emphasis of the left shows its eonic character, but one shifted to the phase of globalization, hence with a sudden potential for direct opposition to the very transition that has generated the whole new era.

We have the clue to the spastic dialectic of the nineteenth century left. It is picture perfect in one way, and completely disorganized in another. It appears promptly to ride the wave of globalization, equalization, and de-Eurocentricization, as a 'helper' process in the degenerations of the post-transition. What might help (we hardly dare to pontificate) is a broader sense of the historical context of civilizations, diffusion fields, globalization(s), and religions, along with a closer look at the emergent character of the democratic revolution. Such a left could be at once a fulfilment and a critique of 'bourgeois modernity', and be aware of its limits in the difficult effort to restage 'modernities' in the diffusion field arising after the Great Divide. Otherwise we should feel condemned to the sudden deviations from the general character of the modern transition, rather than to the fulfilment of its basic action.

These remarks are very general. But they show the context of the paradox of the democratic revolution spawning its own antagonist so swiftly in the wake of the modern transition, and the need to thoroughly grasp the concealed eonic character of the modern democratic wave, thus correcting the too frequent blindness of the left to the nature of its own task, so perfectly in place, yet frittered away in confused theoretical formations unnecessary to that basic task.

Most of all our model is a reminder of the treacherous nature of teleological thinking. Our model gives us a handle on teleological thinking applied to history, even as it severely disciplines any such thinking with a reminder that teleological ideologies are not going to get it straight. The directionality seen in the eonic sequence gives a gift of insight into teleology even as it confiscates such a notion to a higher level, one that political movements in time cannot control. Their task is the realization of the basic tasks of the moment: the eonic emergentism set by the arising processes appearing in the wake of the transition's divide.

2. Modernity: Out of Revolution

2.1 A Great Transformation

We have enough to proceed, but let's start over, as it were, and go over the rise of the modern again very quickly in light of our depiction of the eonic model, to see the way that Marxism emerges very late in the process, after the Great Divide, with what is probably the first glimpse of the eonic effect, but one distorted by its wrong focus on economism, yet animated by the very democratic revolution that it ended by challenging. We can proceed with a series of stepping stone references to the phases of modernity, and then adjourn to a blog-like context, a blog perhaps, to review in more detail the elements seen in our bird's eye view.

Our context is that of the modern transition as the 'great transformation', and this in the context of the eonic sequence, a 'next axial interval', so to speak, with its characteristic frontier effect, three century duration, divide, and aftermath. This frontier effect is completely insidious and bedevils all efforts at clarity as the red herring of Eurocentrism enters to confound what is a stage of globalization, eonic globalization, we must note at once. The localization via a narrow spectrum in a partition created by the Reformation, stretching along a band comprising, roughly, the brief Italian, then the German, Dutch, English, thence French, Spanish, etc, transition zones, confounds easy analysis as hopeless confusion emerges about 'European Western Civilization'. Crediting this 'frontier effect' seems an indulgence in the fantastic, and an uphill struggle of understanding unless we see its greater logic and the way it banishes all confusions, seen rightly. Localization and instant globalization are the elegant if rambunctious result. The spectrum of effects comprises, to be brief, the Protestant Reformation, the German social revolution, thence the rise of modern science, the phase liberal emergentism seen in the English Civil War, the sidewinder emergence of the North American system, suddenly triggered at the Great Divide as a parallel emergence zone (the first of the diffusion field offspring). The Enlightenment, Romantic reaction, great divide, and democratic and industrial revolutions cascade at the climax in a confusing interplay that can't be understood if they are too easily scrambled together as a causal series (the industrial revolution didn't cause democracy, or vice versa). We have independent emergentist processes compressed in a field of manifestation. We see that the modern transition in one of its climaxes in the earthquake of the French Revolution, but it should be noted that our transitions are 'shotgun' in their action, and the apparent failure of the French revolutionary instance might blind us to the overall success of the transition in generating a remarkable string of democratic revolutions, whose natural tendency toward equalization generates the action of radicalizing leftisms.

We have the spectacle of the discrete freedom sequence, in the larger eonic context: the realization that the periodization of democratic emergence is not random, but follows eonic logic. This demands a partition into macro and micro analyses, and the fact must be faced that the burden of realization will, and must, end in the field of the post-transition, the micro field. This rapid downshifting must be understood in any attempt to analyze the outcome of the modern transition and certainly the coming left(s). The danger of sudden appearance of idiocy squared is a liability of such a process, and more generally the integrated transformational character of the transition is not given to what follows in its wake. Subsequent movements might therefore be subject to the limitations of dialectical confusion and deviation from unknown or invisible premises latent in the larger action of the eonic sequence.

We might note in this regard that the fruits of the transition produce very quickly something not present in the transition itself, the rewriting of modernity as an economic civilization in the phase of industrial capitalism. All well and good, but the restriction of a larger potential is, significantly, protested at once by the remnants of the French Revolutionary left, remorphing rapidly into challengers of that first-born outcome of the modern transition.

1848 does indeed seem to be a critical moment as the flood tide of the modernist post-transition gets underway in the coming of globalization.

2.2 Revolutions Per Second

We can restate our point: the modern transformation climaxes in the phase of the Enlightenment, which overflows into the period of the French Revolution, even as the Industrial Revolution, so-called, accompanies the passage into a new form of civilization, one soon dominated by the action of capitalist agents, an outcome intimated perhaps, but not legitimated, by the implications of our transition. The point is merely that this realization is seeded in the field of the macro but realizable only in the field of the micro, the reason for its ambiguous character.

The point to see here is that while the thrust of the modern transition is indeed revolutionary we could not easily mimic its action in a revolutionary gesture. The breadth of the transformation is beyond the simple action of revolutionary elites. This does not mean that it is therefore illegitimate or impossible, only that the result must show an understanding of what real historical evolution is about, and that is hard indeed.

Our transition produces an almost idyllic set of liberal breakthroughs, and then lapses into inaction after the Great Divide. The realization of that potential is left to the free field of micro action.

Let's keep going...

2.3 Discrete Freedom Sequence

It can help to stand back and notice something extraordinary: in terms of our eonic sequence, the tide of democratic revolution, appearing at the Great Divide, is the second instance of this effect, visible in the emergence of democracy in the earlier phase of our eonic sequence. The spooky nature of this timing is something that defies easy understanding, but is a reminder that the name of the game is democratic freedom. Any leftist counterrevolution against that great experiment is likely to deviate at once from the eonic impetus. A point to keep clear in the subsequent chaotifications of bolshevism. And the reason many of the oddly conservatizing agents of the bourgeois sphere make themselves hoarse with libertarian denunciations of the deviated marxisms flooding the globalization sphere.

There we have it: the field of leftist globalization is prone, for theoretical reasons suddenly apparent, to deviations from what would seem (but haven't necessarily been so derived as) eonic teleological projections. Note that teleology is a property of the macro system, hence unknown to us, but as sheer guesswork we can see that its projections from the transition interval of democratic emergentism is somehow the 'name of the game'. Deviate from that at your own risk.

The prodigious emergence of the American sidewinder in the wake of the transition, exploding at the great divide, outflanks any of the humble efforts of the left trying to concoct outlandish fragments of democracy and socialism, while the first-born of the democratic revolution in America proceeds to such success that its fate could be to become the victim of that success as a degenerated imperialistic power thwarting the opportunities of subsequent globalization. Fair or not, the charge is soon so leveled.

It is important to see that this exemplar is not solely a democratic revolution, but a colonial rebellion that exploits its opportunity to stage a democracy. A point to keep in mind as the overwhelming momentum of this creature of the modern divide starts to find the spastic left barking at its heels. The attempts, thence failures, of democratic induction in the micro field, produce contradictory results, collapsing as crypto-capitalist imperialist conspiracies, and require understanding the reversal from macro to micro in the wake of the transition, and should remind the left of the left that the Bolshevik tragedy is both proof of their theoretical inadequacy, yet a reminder as it is packed off to the catacombs to stew over its inadequacies that a mideonic left is needed to challenge the imperial degenerations of the democratic revolution.

2.4 Class Struggles

The basic critique of Marx, and others of the generation of the 1840's (a context in which Marxist thought is instantly understandable), of the issue of democracy and class is suddenly transparent in our analysis: the democratic revolution seemed destined to become sluggishly imbalanced in the struggle toward equalization, and this is compounded by the class implications of the capitalist revolution. Much of the Marxist analysis is cogently adaptable as a plug-in component to our eonic post-transitional analysis, save only that the issue of the industrial proletariat is open to re-analysis as an abstraction invoking a macro dynamics that isn't there. That is, the action of the proletariat is not the same as the action of the eonic sequence, although nothing in our analysis prevents it from becoming so in the future. Marx's formulation is another one of those bon ideas whose future realizations remain unknown and as yet unrealized. That free individuals should graduate to control their eonic destiny at the putative 'end of the eonic sequence' is an adventure yet to happen, one fraught with both logical inevitability and considerable peril as to the outcome. We can table Marx's idea then as a question about the end of the eonic sequence, and the danger of its cooptation still another time by elite subclasses of State domination, etc... In a nutshell, Marx's idea is a first draft of something still to be realized. The Bolshevik revolution doesn't rate much mention on that score.

The basic action of the eonic sequence is that of state formation, counter state formation (and religion formation), i.e. equalization (the revolution of the state, the revolution against the state), followed by...anarchy?

Our analysis doesn't predict the future here.

2.5 Historical Inevitabilities

We should conclude this chapter with two citations relevant to the discussion: the critique of historical inevitability, and the question of the Hegelian 'end of history'.

The charges against Marxist theory found classic formats in the critiques of Isaiah Berlin and Karl Popper as to historical inevitability and historicism, respectively. A tendency toward deterministic analysis haunted marxist theories with the confused result we see in the wake of the Second Internationale and the Bolshevik episode: should agents stand back passively to allow the unfolding from teleological premises or should they actively work to bring about the result. This confused situation is a symptom of an inadequate theory and a false teleological projection against events. We can see that the eonic model more adequately reanalyzes this situation as the interplay of two levels. The only teleological anything we could glimpse here is that of the democratic revolution, and this is forced into the distinction of macro and micro phases. There is thus no teleological projection of a socialist future that is safe for us to endorse. The more likely result is simply a series of mal-formed experiments attempting to blend incoherent elements. This is not an argument against socialism, only a reminder that such a project would need to be constructivist as a gesture of free men. Historical inevitability thinking based on an undefined abstraction called 'socialism' distracted Marxist from the need to think practically about what they intended.

The distinction in our model between system action and free action suggests the nature of the problem confronting rigid theories. The result is simply, men become free to do as they please, but unless they can produce a democratic system, whether socialist or not, their efforts are likely to produce unstable results. We can't resolve this question fully, save to note that a careful study of the American revolution and subsequent democracy formation shows all the elements needed for the creation of a socialist democracy as a practical gesture of innovative politics. But we must consider that, for whatever reason, the success of this classic gesture put the emphasis on the formation of a republic first and foremost. Without a republican basis, a socialist gesture is going to end in the wreckage of a totalitarian resolution. Thus, look closely at the stage of republican experimentations to find the lost vitamins of socialist theory, even as the class basis of much that is visible in the American experiment begins to stand out. Remorphable potential outcomes suggest themselves without limit, and free us of the Leninist temptation to forego this real complexity of democratic realization.

As to the 'end of history' question, we will refer the reader to the treatment in the text of *World History and The Eonic Effect*, noting that Hegel's and Fukuyama's version are hardly the same. The point for us is that our model suggests a much simpler rendering of the question, indeed the question, have we reached the 'end of the eonic sequence'? If so the potential of free action in the wake of a prodigious system is open to the dangers and difficulties of free realizations that misinterpret the eonic sequence.

As to Hegel's idea, it is obvious that he seems to sense the eonic effect, and its 'freedom generation', and wishes to give a teleological basis for that. In our version, we see that the effort to maintain the achievements of democracy during the entry to the micro phase of the post-transition require understanding that the emergence of freedom has a macro aspect that is evolutionary, and that micro deviations from that will fritter away the gains of time in a new mediavalism. We thus echo Hegel's point: there's no going back. Unfortunately, we must realize that the brief emergence of Greek democracy was all too brief, and the action of mideoic elements is not controlled by the eonic sequence. Thus, the vigilance required to stay on course, a vigilance present up to a point in the leftist discourse, but all too obvious itself subject to the post-transitional chaotification of the mainline induction.

3. 1848+: Ends and Beginnings

3.1 End of Eonic Sequence?

We can conclude our brief tour by laying down a few more rubrics of discussion, in the process connecting our discussion to the question of evolution.

We have already raised the issue of the Hegelian 'end of history', replacing that with a different analysis of our own. What Hegel was talking about is not always clear. In our version, the issues are crystal clear, without presuming to predict anything about a long-range future we cannot control.

In our version, we are left with a spectacle, looking backward, of an immense evolutionary process, the eonic sequence, whose character is both mysterious and yet transparent in its effects.

Here's the paradox: as we come to an awareness of this process we must suspect that its action will subside, not just in the near future, but for good. We have no final grounds for such a prediction, but we can see that the implications of our model are those of an 'evolution of freedom' and that its macro aspect must at some point subside and leave the field to the self-evolution as the self-realization of freedom of those men who have passed through its action. This puts a premium on the final autonomy and free action in the formal analysis so elegantly provided by the eonic pattern, and our model. That leaves a rather open-ended discussion, as it should, and also tokens the ominous possibility that the gains of freedom can be lost in the recurrence of history's curse, the domination of narrow elites. We see an eonic logic to the emergence of freedom and this historical data shows us the best of arguments against those who will stage the reactionary gestures so obvious from history of those whose ambitions are inadequate to the future potential of man.

3.2 A Liberal World

Our analysis has shown the eonic roots of the liberal emergentist world that arises with such momentum in the nineteenth century. We have produced without trying something leftists scorn, a theoretical legitimation of a political system in terms of an argument of historical dynamics. But, since we did it without trying, there might be something to it, and at least the result might be free of some bias for being a side effect of an analysis that began with the Pharaohs and passed through the multiple

universes of the Axial Age. Our eonic sequence produces a series of self-enclosed worlds, and the liberal nexus seems to be another of them. Relative to the ages past, it can, and should, be seen as an immense achievement, and proof of some evolutionary claim of progress.

That a group of leftist hotheads saw fit to bicker over the result almost before it came into existence shows perhaps the justice in dialectics, and the claim one must grant that the eonic sequence having produced one world is potentially the source of an infinity of others. But at least we should consider that the replication of the action of the eonic sequence is a task not likely to succeed with eclectic innovations of theory. We see a world whose elements require thorough mastery and that in the larger context of world history as a whole.

Our eonic model is thus completely open to multiple perspectives on such questions and even opens a folder called 'TP4 exceptions', or the analysis, which the reader can pursue in the text of World History and The Eonic Effect, of general mideonic start up formations, whether these fulfill or deviate in our estimation from the eonic sequence. This involves among other tasks the study of the great religions and also the consideration, so deftly muzzled in the propaganda of that Hegelian rascal Fukuyama, of the, yes, Zoroastrian thunders latent in our eonic analysis. The beginnings we see in the eonic effect demand, if only by a process of logical inevitability, the query, woefully metaphysical, about the 'ends of things', thence the ministrations of mad prophets as to the 'end times'. To unsettle our quaintly foundationalist analysis of a liberal world with the pronouncements of the once and future Zarathustras is proper suspense in a tale left unfinished, but perhaps Fukuyama had a point. We can see that in a discrete-continuous system that outcomes tend to stabilize and endure, save only that that stabilization at its initial point could be flawed from the start, inducing the obsession to redo the beginnings that we see in the Marxist Zarathustras.

We have to leave it there for the moment, having granted ample latitude for both, or many, perspectives, having achieved what any Marxist needs to have achieved, a basic clarification of liberalism in action, a gesture certainly present, most unclearly, in the famous manifesto of Marx.

We should note in passing the structural resemblance of the left of the left to the situation spawned in the wake of the Axial Age, wherein the parallel emergentism of the Judaic and Greco-Roman transitions induced a collision of the two and a highly ambiguous 'revolution against Rome' resulting in a theocratic statism of equivocal status.

Anyone in the leftist catacomb would do well to ponder this outcome in all possible aspects, humble to the finitude of human aspiration dressed up in Zoroastrian finery confronted with the probable outcomes in frozen medievalism.

3.3 Rational the Real

Our analysis has passed quietly through that mysterious land first charted by the philosopher Hegel, but with a different model and result. We should pause to consider for a moment the legacy of that great figure and take note of the well-known history of the left on this issue, and the great confusion over Hegel that arose in Marxist theoretical gestures. That generation of Hegelianism, we should note, clusters near our Great Divide, and thus we can be sure, if not in theory, in a sort of 'eonic

hunch', that it will prove important and recurring, whatever the verdict of transient scientism on its metaphysically outlandish demeanor. Fukuyama is proof of that. How on earth did a concoction of Hegelianism sneak its way back into the political discourse in an age of hard science and regimented scientism. How did he manage it?

Our eonic model can easily answer the question, and is robust enough to easily either 'sublate' and/or bypass the ruminations of Hegel, but we must insist that we have produced an historical analysis that stands on its own terms and borrows nothing from Hegelian dialectics, showing rather a Kantian emphasis on the issues of so-called transcendental idealism. Our solid model is thus potentially superior in practice to the dangerous gamble with dialectic that animated Hegel and haunted his followers. The question must be left to further research.

We need not come to any final decision on these issues, save to warn that the eonic sequence doesn't resolve as a dialectical process. And we should caution that the degenerations of dialectic in the promotion of revolution are one of the least rigorous, in fact, shallowest corners of Marxist theory. Our model enforces a discipline that a revolutionary might dislike: it grants no legitimation for future revolutionary trials as deterministic or teleological outcomes in theory, restricting such ventures to what they should be, the actions of free men, and no doubt hare-brained men, destined to miscalculate their situations. That said, with ominous precision, the eonic sequence generates not only a liberal world, but a potential failsafe protocol in the outcome of mideonic confusion.

As to Hegel, it is hard to compete with the momentum and reputation of this classic, but we might note that our eonic model reissues the discourse that bedeviled Hegel, his discussion of the rational as the real, a pronouncement he lived to regret as his leftist followers proceeded to find the actual slightly less than rational.

Our eonic model resummons this issue in another terminology, without Hegel's faux pas, by making its gist an issue of two levels. And indeed, in the eonic sequence we see the way in which the ideal and the 'real' can intersect, leaving us with a sense of the rationality of history quite compatible with an evaluation of its irrationality.

So, we can peddle our wares confident in a robust upgrade of Hegelian thinking on the mysteries of Reason in History.

3.4 From Kant To Feuerbach

Hegel can be a confusing thinker unless seen in the context of German classical philosophy as a whole. Then the appearance of Kant (and Rousseau) at the moment of the great divide stands out as the equal generator of leftist considerations. We have but to consider the implications of Kant's ethical deliberations on the categorical imperative in the sense of a 'kingdoms of ends' to find that stolid Protestant devotion a drastic revolutionary by the force of unwitting logic alone. In any case, his system of transcendental idealism is the right starting point for discussions of the enigma of the eonic effect and its operation on different levels of action. And unmatched is Kant's formulation of the riddle of human freedom in the context of Newtonian causal scientism. The subsequent episodes of Hegelianism are hard pressed to transcend the problems indicated in that starting point. Whatever the

case, the rough and ready match of Newtonian foundations to a projected discourse on the noumenal character of freedom in relation to its temporal manifestation finds in the eonic model a match of dynamics to the facts that should lead us to reconsider the gyrations between idealism and materialism that tear apart the generation of the socialist birth which ends with the Marxist embrace of an inadequate Feuerbachian termination of Hegelianism. Kant is the classic liberal at his most classic and echoes a logic of republicanism that will surface in perfect concert at the Great Divide. Kant is also a reminder that the fate of modernity is bound up in the need to complete or transcend the initial phase of the Protestant Reformation, whose structural position in the modern transition gives it a sturdiness that will rival anything the left might hope to produce as it is allied with the late decay of modernist philosophy into technological scientism. Hegel well understood this crucial positioning of the Protestant Reformation, and its fulfillment in philosophical modernism is a fitting endgame to the convulsion of Axial religions confronting the modern transition. That the Reformation finds one completion in the wake of Hegel and another in the brilliant recasting of ancient sutras in Schopenhauer and still another in the wake of the left is a useful insight into the integrated nature of the modern transition, and we might consider the Kantian deliberations on the issues of 'religion in the light of reason' and see that its cascading exemplars must include the almost religious character of the arising left, bequeathed the tasks of equalization so evident in the momentum of the Axial religions, soon to become theocratic churches coopting the basic thrust of religion formation with the religious ideologies of elite statism.

3.5 Last and First Men

We should conclude fast here, with a connection indicated to the idea of evolution, this time an idea of evolution quite different from that of Darwin, or for that matter that of Nietzsche, whose denunciation of the last man, that creature we have momentarily established rather as an eonic agent, the stolid bourgeois type about his business in the post-transition.

In fact, we have left this creature to his mideonic fate as our analysis jumps to a different level of macrohistory, indeed, nothing less than macroevolution.

Our connection between history and evolution can be pursued in additional blogbook series of this type, but the point for us here is that we have potentially reconciled the idea of evolution and history in a way that ironically wishes to redefine the irony latent in the scoffing Nietzsche's mockery of the 'last man'.

For us the relativity of first and last men can be seen in the transposition of the idea to that of the first and last of the apes, man, in the evolution of homo sapiens. We tend to focus on the early generation of history in the wake of some putative earlier evolution of man. But in our formulation the 'evolution' of man is on-going, reaching even into the present and future of civilization, with the counter-evolution of history from that evolution indicated in the relationship of the eonic sequence to the emerging self-consciousness of those destined to be left to their self-evolution.

So perhaps Nietzsche had a point, to wit, that man is destined to something more than the stabilization as a type in an economic fixation of bourgeois existence. Sounds like Marx. The human creature can or should or must in the end generate the true first from the last man, or better, the last man, evolved from the first. In the nonce the confusions of Nietzsche over the nature of the overman, perhaps as some Darwinian supermonster, are to be reminded of the considerations of those who got it

right the first time, starting with Rousseau, who pointed to the necessity of equalization in the context of decayed nightmares called 'civilization', and the way in which our eonic sequence gives expression to that different concept of evolution seen in the evolution of freedom, a far cry from the degenerated fiasco of theory visible in the scientism of Darwinism, which so misled the genius of Nietzsche.

Conclusion

We have completed, or else begun, our consideration of the place of the classic left in relation to the eonic history generated by the eonic sequence, hopefully in the process showing both the significance, and yet limits, of conventional leftist (usually Marxist) discourse. In a way we need a dose of someone like Marx to properly evaluate our eonic sequence, for a simple reason: our model in general speaks of the 'eonic observer' attempting, despite his immersion in the history he wishes to recount, attempting to discover and describe the eonic effect, and this requires more than just the realization of the outcome of the modern transition, but more the amplification of self-consciousness to an objectivity about the circumstances of that sudden mechanization of outcomes in the wake of the greater action of the macro level. Notable is the sluggish undertow that we see in the sudden conservatizing of the realizations of modern freedom in the ideology of classical liberalism, no doubt due to the sudden gigantism of the grafting of capitalism onto liberalism. This realization might not do justice to the full potential of the transition, thence the demands from the left of critique. Here the attempt to both analyze and realize the outcomes of revolutionary modernity find their expression in the figures of the age of Marx's youth, in the confusions of the revolutions 1848. We can't exclude this consideration, even as we avail ourselves of a truly potent model for the explication of liberal emergentism. We have a true powerhouse of theory at our fingertips, but it comes with a price, that of a balanced assessment of the totality of modernist emergentism, and beyond that of the greater eonic sequence constituting evolutionary Civilization in the throes now of post-transitional globalization.

Although the radical Marxist left can be seen via the basic matrix of eonic periodization as post-transitional operatives, they arise just at the boundary between the transition of macro to micro action and remain of intrinsic interest, and not just historically. Lest this be a designation of 'Johnny come latelies' we should demand a thorough study of first moments in the modern transition, and not just that of Lutheran Reformers, those prophetic anticipations of the bourgeoisie, but of Thomas Munzer, that Zoroastrian hothead about the business of class struggle, at the dawn of modernity. We are left with the endgame, and a Marxist question, did the modern transition fulfill its potential? Did the gestures toward the equalization of the whole result in a success, or, as with the fate of the Munzer himself, end in the restoration of the dominant classes? We have but to compare the English Civil War with the 'revolution' of 1688 to consider the difference and a possibly ominous answer to our question. In perfect symmetry, figures such as Munzer at the start and Marx and Engels at the end, induce a mysterious echo effect, and we should come to the conclusion with that question raised at the beginning, which leaves us with a need to challenge our depiction of evolutionary emergentism with its own implications, the possible deficit of macro and micro action.

