

**Two Manifestos**

**Toward**  
**A New Communist Manifesto**  
**&**  
**Democratic**  
**Market Neo-communism**

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## **TOWARD A NEW COMMUNIST MANIFESTO**

...The distinguishing feature of Communism is not the abolition of property generally, but the abolition of bourgeois property. But modern bourgeois private property is the final and most complete expression of the system of producing and appropriating products, that is based on class antagonisms, on the exploitation of the many by the few. In this sense, the theory of the Communists may be summed up in the single sentence: Abolition of private property... From the Communist Manifesto

### **The Crisis of Capitalist Globalization**

At a time of social crisis, the classic Manifesto of Marx and Engels in the era of the 1848 revolutions resonates with an eerie relevance for the age of neoliberalism and dangerous climate change. The clever fiction of the end of history is exposed as an artifice of philosophic legerdemain, Hegel from the bottom of the deck. The original tour de force would be a hard act to

follow, but in reality our 'new' manifesto is a studied echo of the old brought to its real future, via the prophetic desperation of two revolutionaries before their time. The era of the 1848 upheavals, in the last tremors of the mighty French Revolution, has been called a turning point in world history, but one which failed to turn. It is an ironic aspect of our current era that this 'revolution manqué' is an apt metaphor for our own predicament. It threw down the gage to the future of the whole of indusreality. That remarkable period of revolt was a shot over the bows of the capitalist revolution unfolding toward its long march to globalization, with the problematical outcome of its success beset once again with the haunting realization the failure to turn is a world of markets going mad. A rational limit or else overthrow of the new capitalist affair might have spared the planetary community much suffering, but now the issue goes into the critical zone, as the crisis reaches a point of no return. And that moment has a symbolic significance in terms of a larger view of world history.

The status of late capitalism is desperate:

As the planet nears the point of no-return at the threshold of climate criticality, the conservative sector of the American congress threatens to veto the US treaty obligation with respect to the recent Paris climate conference: this example typifies the extreme terminal ideological seizure of consciousness by capitalist ideology and tokens a recompute of the American system of government...

The crisis of capitalism is the crisis of planetary destruction in the onset of catastrophic climate change. And this is becoming a crisis of modernity itself. The inability of the powers of government to mediate the capitalist process condemns both and asks for a program of (new) communism to bring sanity to a body politic mesmerized by the ideology of economic illusion. The tenets of free market economics have been exposed to stark falsification in the inability of the system to respond to the disaster of climate change. This extreme example leads to a second look at much of the rest of the ideology of random economic activity. Self-regulating markets are shown to be a myth. The effect of ideology blinding agents to their situation is clearly prophesied by the earliest observers of capitalism.

Marx/Engels correctly saw the crisis of globalization and deserve to speak for our present in the rough outline of their remarkable Manifesto. We must try to 'throughpass' their classic while creating a more flexible superset

of that classic as a venue to practical realization. We will concretize the result with a gesture to define 'market neo-communism' as one realization of the original proclamations. We must emphasize the prefix 'neo' and move to a discussion of a New Communism as if encountering the idea for the first time.

Marxist shibboleths It is a spectacular effect to see the period of the passing of the Hegelian school proceed to the era of Feuerbach and the many associated figures of that period, including Marx and Engels who spawn the new vision of economic history just at the point of the failed revolutions of 1848. Those revolutions failed, but they prophesied the future of a 'last revolution' that would set the true fate of modernity. Clearly they were premature, as Marx/Engels sensed... Those two went on to create a remarkable canon to codify a new view of society, economics, and revolution, one that would nearly overtake the twentieth century, despite what we see now is still another version of the failed revolutions of 1848, and the roll back after 1989. Marxism produces a powerful basic corpus, but, as noted, it has elements of distortion, or so we suspect... We should note that it was beset with the difficulty of analyzing economic systems, the debates over the labor theory of value, as one example, and the sudden onset of marginalist economics in one of the spookiest of capitalism dead bed survivals. Beyond this we see also the appearance of Kantian ethical socialism in an attempt to critique the reductionist positivism of the marxists. Beyond this the proliferation of social democratic substitutes for the full transition beyond capitalism.

Leninist interlude The first aftershock of the 1848 'failed revolutions' was the great Russian Revolution, which was both a standard democratic revolution of the classic type attempting to overthrow the medieval Tsarist phantom, and a first attempt to bring about the final revolution against capitalism. The question of Leninism arises in this context as a hard to evaluate circumstance that carries a flawed ideological complex but which probably prophesies the future of 'chase plane' communism to come... Lenin is not a transparent figure who belongs to his followers, but a mysterious agent of revolution in a prefiguration of the coming of postcapitalism. The core issues are the ethical perspectives of the agent of change, and the need for an economic solution to the operation of markets. We can and should argue the 'dialectic' of these two questions, and see the way an ethical nihilism, foreseen by the Kantian socialists, can enter like bilge water into the good ship Communism, and the way that the cunning capitalists with tricks of phantom calculus outplayed Marxist rendering of Adam Smith,

and how figures like the market evangelist Mises, etc., performed the feat of turning the idea of freedom into a libertarian finesse, along with a valid challenge to socialist planning on the grounds of the dynamic of markets.

**Last Men and their Smartphones** The passing of the Leninist Interlude has given the appearance of final sanction to the capitalist future, but already by the end of the twentieth century the reality would seem that a flawed socialism was abandoned to search for the real thing, even as the so-called neoliberal age began a rapid conquest of globalization, economy, and government. The fall of the original Leninist interlude begins even to seem a mistake, despite its massively flawed outcomes.

The basic development of communism is and remains nonetheless a world historical outcome to the modern transition, in ambiguous relation to democracy, and will spawn sooner or later a new version in the wake of the failure of bolshevism... At the moment of climate crisis, we sense the desperation of the euphoria over the capitalist miracle with its final gesture of planetary destruction. The debate over the last man, which started with Nietzsche takes an ominous leftist form as the ideological rigor mortis of capitalist ideological in its final symptoms produces a social nexus completely bemused to the point of blindness to the destruction of environment, and the final carbon destiny of the capitalist industrial revolution. Nietzsche was a distortion of the early modern, but had a point about the 'last man': the participants in the modern experiment are moving toward the completion of the 'great transition' or the evolution of man, and this requires that 'free agency' come to an understanding and self-replication of the macrosequence.... But the downside is the commodity fetishism so visible in the smartphone mania outbreak at the point of atmospheric breakdown.

**Last Phase of Capitalism** We can conclude by pointing to the eerie downfall of the capitalist Faust in the pact with the logic of derivatives and catastrophic margin calls. We refer the reader to the Hollywood movie... the profits in downfall. The last phases of capitalism show the capitalist axioms proceeding toward the destruction of the world system in an orgy of financialization... The period 2008 made plain a new form of capitalist finance: the bet against the system, an omen of the self-destructive character of the capitalist lunacy syndrome...

Drafting a New Manifesto...



Our stance must reckon with the difficulty of even listing all the issues relevant to the case. We start with a stripped down simplification:

The distinguishing feature of Communism is not the abolition of property generally, but the abolition of bourgeois property. But modern bourgeois private property is the final and most complete expression of the system of producing and appropriating products, that is based on class antagonisms, on the exploitation of the many by the few. In this sense, the theory of the Communists may be summed up in the single sentence: Abolition of private property. From the Communist Manifesto

We take one key paragraph from the Manifesto and then move to create a larger domain of discourse for its realization, including a discussion of history in a book as appendix. This selection of one key idea can lead to a path that can both extend and leave alone the original legacy. We might think in terms of a dialectical review or negation of the original tradition, and a final reaffirmation of the core. But we will also be critical of dialectics.

We come to a simple resolution of the issues in crisis: the core of the Manifesto of Marx and Engels, the expropriation of the bourgeoisie: we must propose the return of the property wrested from the Commons to the Commons. We are done.

The legacy of marxism can pass into an appendix mediating its classic themes with a strong dialectical negation, and reconstruction. But an elaborate theory is not needed. The original critique was of ‘theory and ideology’: rival theories have obscured the original cogency of the critical expose.

We can create a virtual manifesto based on the original’s key idea: the abolition of private property and review the whole legacy emerging from that. Our aim here is a kind of generalized manifesto generator as a series of proposals for an historical review of the classic of Marx/ Engels, next to the legacies of nineteenth century revolutionaries. At the forefront is the question of postcapitalism and the defining histories, and futurism, of the communist project, here to be dubbed ‘neo-communism’. We can put this in the context of a larger perspective based on a universal history of man in the context of evolution.

Our manifesto is therefore about a form of (market) neo-communism

in which the ownership of capital reverts to the commons. This is not the same as state socialism or the control of economies by a 'bourgeoisie' of revolutionary one-party professionals. This core axiom is related to the classic discourse of primitive accumulation.

Despite the problems, the core analysis of Marx/Engels created a revolution in thought that exposed the issues of class and class struggle, theory and ideology, and the potential of the working class. Much of this should animate the manifestos of the future.

The definition of the 'working class' is often ambiguous and the concept might imply the persistence of class and class ideology/domination by one class persisting into communism. Our manifesto will propose a generalization of the working class: The Universal Class.

Challenging the legacy of marxism would create a lot of resistance and in many ways it is fine the way it is, taken as the Old Testament to a New. Simple demesmerization is enough. But the legacy's theoretical add-ons create unnecessary resistance in many who would otherwise support a postcapitalist option. We can suggest a larger framework than that of Feuerbach, historical materialism, and dialectical materialism. These subjects are not necessary for a movement toward a New Communism. Having used an idea of the dialectic we should also move to critique the legacy of dialectical thinking and the way it has produced a set of confusions based on logical superstition. An avenue to a New Communism cannot successfully foreclose on religious issues using historical materialism. A new movement in this cast must become cognizant of the place of religion in world history, the interior content of such legacies as Christianity, Buddhism, Confucianism, and redefine the secular in terms more adequate than the humanism cultism of the era of reductionist scientism. Strangely, aggressive 'secularists' have tried to redefine modernity by ignoring the work of figures such as Kant in mediating the issues of metaphysics shared by both religion and scientism. Our appendix offers an empirical chronology able to reconcile multiple contradictory viewpoints., as an encyclopedia of civilizations.

This early period of Marx/Engels was prior to the emergence of the now dogmatic canon of marxism whose overall format is classic, but may be inadequate to the task of a transition to postcapitalism: it was outflanked very early by neo-classical economics. and the communist idea was merely packaged by marxism. Its source is prior to the onset of the marxist legacy.

The canon of Marx/Engels has become dogmatic and is further entangled with the legacy of the Second and subsequent Internationales, including the entire episode of the Bolshevik revolution. The roots of modern communism predate the coming of marxism and we are under no hard and fast obligation to honor the capture of the idea in the era of scientism.

We might consider the figures of Lenin and Stalin red herrings that do not indicate an experiment toward communism. Despite the cogency of many aspects of Lenin's remarkable coup d'état the Bolshevik experiment is an immense distraction. The left needs to start from scratch with the real components of the question.

The context of modern economies is confronted with the idea of a New Communism with the potential of electoral to revolutionary challenge. We know such a revolution is possible because all of our modern states began with revolutions, and the core issue of marxism was to create a form of communism in order to save the bourgeois revolution for 'real democracy'. We are beset with many more issues than were discussed in the classic of Marx and Engels, the most critical being the world of strategic nuclear war and deterrence. We will adopt a perspective of universal nuclear disarmament as appropriate to the mood of communist internationalism.

We confront the intractable question of peace in a global system of states as we attempt a federation of socialist republics. But our more general matrix may well provide the clue to the solution of this complex issue.

This in turn raises the question of our focus on the US system and its history and liabilities: we can envision a national version of neo-communism in an international context. We have three or more situations: an international movement of the working classes (or our Universal Class)

locally and globally as a colonial revolt against American imperialism the same as a revolt against a global system of neoliberal domination itself internationalizing and attempting a radical transnationalism (e.g. the TPP conventions making national governments subject to secret tribunals) national movements of communist revolution in isolation or tandem internationally joker in the deck transformation of the 'empire' candidate via Napoleonic expansion of an imperial postcapitalism.

The latter is preposterous but can focus thought with a reminder of

the way democratic and communist ideas can fail.

The question of communism has been suffered the extremes of its proponents and critics, and worst of all, in spite of the cycle of realization given by the Bolshevik era, a failure to define its canon in a fashion that is fully coherent. Despite the illusory discourse of the 'end of history' it remains true that there is a consistent tension between the realizations of democracy and socialism or communism. We should be careful to qualify the term as New Communism.

The 'end of history' meme has been extremely destructive. We can replace this mystification with a new model of history showing the relationship of freedom, free agency, revolution, democratic emergence, historical dynamics, and historical directionality or teleology. Hegelian mystification has muddled both capitalist ideology and marxist scientism.

We might forget that one of the first revolutionary movements of the modern era, that of Thomas Münzer and the Peasants Revolt of 1625 sounded a communist note, and this in a religious context, long before the tide of democratic revolution cresting at the end of the eighteenth century and beyond. This should warn us again of what many latter radical students have diagnosed: the democracy manqué of the many bourgeois revolutions that arose. This phenomenon is visible in the counterrevolution that emerged in the wake of the English Civil War. This kind of criticism animated the profound analyses of such as Marx and Engels, and the issue was finally the great puzzle of how to really stage a democratic revolution if this was always the frustrated outcome as capitalocracy.

The classic legacy attempts to impose the theory of historical materialism, but this is a luxury a new movement should do without. That legacy became mired in the confusion of evolutionary theories, although Marx saw the problem at once.

The revolutionary movement of the modern transition was a protocommunist formation. The progression toward democratic revolution, e.g. the English Civil War, and abolitionism, was clearly associated with Protestant versions of the Reformation. The sudden alternate track in the wake of figures such as Feuerbach has its own logic but threw the legacy of communism out of kilter by alienating religious sectors with reductionist ideologies such as historical materialism.

Historical materialism is a curiously apt depiction of economic ideology, but as a theory it fails, and critics seem to know this better than marxists. But all theories of society in the cast of scientism are destined to fail. We can take the module as an ideological flourish, or philosophic experiment, a creature of its time, with a point, one we should not forget, recasting it in a new and more cogent format. That format should failsafe with a recursion of the entire dialectical spectrum of the modern transition, electing to proceed with renewable interpretative subjects.

This legacy suggests that the early marxist formulation became an excessively narrow perspective colored by the post-Hegelian reaction and the onset of positivistic scientism. The reality of modernism is clearly something much broader and a New Communism must refound modernity as a whole in a new constellation of economic postcapitalism. It needs a generalized systems view of history, rather than a dialectical contraction around dogmatic materialism. It must find a true dialectic in the counterpoint of opposites given by the early modern, between religion, science, philosophy, and the arts.

The era of scientism that absorbed marxism also produced the reign of Darwinism and this was exposed many times as an ideology of social Darwinism. The left needs to assist the progress of science in exposing this pseudo-science without getting entangled in the field of religious reaction based on creationist thinking.

The many studies of the Iron Cage effect of the nineteenth century expose the plight of cultic marxism and its problems with theories soon the object of multiple refutations and critical attacks.

The legacy enforces a now dated materialism which is beside the point. A communist society of the future needs a broad spectrum of philosophy. That was provided from the start by German Classical philosophy, which was rejected in the phase of the post-Hegelian reaction.

The core issue of the revolutionary age of the early modern, a query we inherit, is the nature of modernity itself. In many ways the modern has been hijacked by the capitalist transition at the end of the eighteenth century, granting that the larger history of capitalism stretches over history since the Neolithic in its primordial versions. And yet the early modern shows a far different character beyond the gestating economic format that so soon overtook its future.

The secular equivalent of religion In many ways the nature of modernity remains an enigma: its sudden contraction in the nineteenth century has been observed by many. Perhaps this is the reason that the early modern transition seems to generate a dual personality, between religious reformation and scientific revolution, as if the latter as it bootstraps toward higher levels of complexity is constantly stalled in a reductionist scenario. The companion in parallel of religious continuation of retrograde antiquity carries the remainder not covered by science. This situation was partially mediated by Kant, but the larger picture of secular era must be seen to include 'religion' in transition.

Examples of the discrepancy between the two systems in parallel modernity are beliefs about free will or agency, the reality of the soul, issues of immortality, the ethics of social action, and much else. Modernity is an incomplete study thus. Questions of religion, evolution, and idealism versus materialism are routinely botched in the secular sphere. The religions of the Reformation, now followed by the flood of New Age movements attempting to exploit the 'crisis of modernity' for religious reaction. A New Communism should be dialectically 'rich' and thus beyond theism/atheism, propose or accept beliefs in homo sapiens as a superstitious ape with a soul, a will, a psychology of complex consciousness, an aesthetic/ethical sense, with a Kantian propensity without limits to metaphysics. The soul/self seems to border on a noumenal/phenomenal distinction.

Such formulations are numerous, dime a dozen, but they warn us not to foreclose on the complexity of man with simplistic reductionism, or futile collisions of materialism and idealism.

The sudden replacement of the emergence of ethical modernism as a philosophical successor to religion was suddenly replaced with the card tricks of figures such as Adam Smith unwitting proposing a 'transvaluation of values' long before Nietzsche, and this has destabilized the philosophic, cultural, what to say economic outcome of an instantly distorted modernity (taken as the successor to conventional religious ethics). Figures such as Marx moved at once in a kind of instant feedback to challenge this sudden blight on the 'modern question'. Smith himself is misunderstood and that figure was quite aware of the dangers of his 'fix' in the nature of ethical reasoning. Unfortunately, the scientism of the early marxists crippled their ethical reasoning, a factor subject to attempted correction by the appearance

of the Kantian ethical socialists.

That modernity began we often forget with a Reformation, and was counterpoint in a dialectical spectrum of immense richness, between science, religion, philosophy, political science, art, and, indeed, economics. There was never a stable outcome in the economic fundamentalism that became the social matrix for such an abundance of innovations. And just as the capitalist phenomenon became the hidden lever of state it was also to condition all other aspects of modern culture. It is not surprising therefore that emerging from the radical protests of the age of democratic revolution was a protest against the revolution itself as an ambiguous empowerment of a new class, the bourgeoisie.

The generation of Feuerbach attempted a radical caesura with the legacy of religion, as a final stage of the Reformation. But in the era of scientism this backfired. A New Communism must fulfill this gesture in any case, but should review its early modern potential and try again via the secular equivalent of religion

This nexus of core ideas was the source of the classic rendering of Marx and Engels starting in the 1840's when a whole series of radical thinkers produced a first realization of the core symphonic of the early modern. This period remains ambiguous and its secular humanism seems now a contracted version of a legacy it could barely master, but this was the period of the first high tide of secularism, capitalism, and evolutionism, soon to become the dominant paradigm of Darwinism. But a reasonable strategy must be wary of ill-considered negations of these legacies: it is necessary to create a superset of the originals.

The parallel, almost ominous, appearance of a chase plane antagonist seemed unable at first to justify its prophecy of postcapitalism, but the two centuries since that forward pass into our future shows the mysterious coordination of opposites that constitute the early modern. We see now the prescience of the whole period in the way it spawns the track of globalization via the phenomenon of the market and the future resolution of its concealed contradictions in the gestation of revolutionary communism, so eloquently foretold in the famous manifesto of the year 1848.

The question of communism is the question of democracy itself, and the totalitarian outcome of the Bolshevik revolution requires a double critique

of state socialisms and the nexus of capitalist domination of the bourgeois state, And the totalitarian drift of the American juggernaut must expose the full story of the hidden coup d'état created by the emergence of covert agencies. The record of conspiracy is barely told even on the left, and the climactic moment of the record of imperialism, manufactured war and covert action must focus on the extravagant turn of events in the documented 9/11 conspiracy whose implications stretch from the question of who controls the American system to the place of Israel in the control of its politics. The 9/11 conspiracy The shocking discovery of a hidden cabal behind the events of 9/11 has exposed a deep vein of criminality behind the current US government. This a revelation of a secret government invisible to the public, and its neutralization is essential for any real change. A revolutionary government is at severe risk of being taken over by such entities.

In relation to this a leftist perspective confronts the stark reality of the history of modern Israel and its indirect influence on American politics. A coherent stance against this apartheid system enters inevitably into any discussion of transformation of American politics.

The left has defaulted to its anarchist and Gandhian pacifist modes as the full complement of revolutionary action is excised from the definitions of activist radicalism.

The emphasis of Marx and Engels on the working class was a classic of strategy but one that confronts a shift in the nature of sociological realities and the ambiguity of class in the generation of a Universal Class. The working class is often the object of rightist manipulations giving it a reactionary character. And the working class in an international constellation of outsourced work zones beyond the reach of a national entity. Our new manifesto might posit the action of the Universal Class in the context of the abolition of private property and the restoration of industrial ownership to the Commons as a legal entity with constitutional independence from communist elites emerging in a one party state solution of the type that confounded the Russian revolution. The issue is simple: we cannot really hypostatize an abstraction such as the 'working class' as an agent of history.

The legacy of marxism is ambiguous: it is stuck in another century. The gist of our manifesto is to take the core paragraph of the original: the



expropriation of the bourgeoisie, and set the rest to one side. We don't need a theory of historical materialism, dialectical materialism, such a strong prejudice against idealism. We need simple praxis not trying to convert everyone to a new philosophy.

We need a core movement that has some marxist dna, but which operates with its own version of a new communism, able to decipher the neo-classical economic illusion, ready to fight for control of the industrial apparatus in motion, and ready to create a market communism, possibly on its way to full communism. A market communism with a Commons, as opposed to state control by a one party bourgeoisie calling itself radical, with a cutoff point below which some forms of commerce, industry, and agriculture operate independently would be nice. Issues of constitutional balance of powers, core rights (without liberal economic rights of capital), newly defined democracy, national/transnational action to create a global federation....

The issue of free agency, choice, with or without claims about free will, haunts the regime of scientism emerging from the New Physics, a point clearly analyzed by Kant. The idea of freedom ended up being orphaned in the emergence of marxist scientism. But that issue is the key to exposing the theoretical ideology of classical and neo-classical economics. The latter is clearly based on questions of consumer choice in economic free agents, and his contradicted by the outlandish abuse of the classic differential calculus.

Marxists tend to lose their grip over their own critique of 'theory and ideology':

Neo-classical economics is buttressed by an immense amount of mathematical theory justifying things as they are, but there is a stark antinomy at the core of this orgy of calculus: theories invented for physics cannot be transferred to social situations involving free agency. We can 'luke-skywalker' the entire death star with this antinomy in one heroic flourish, one that marxists put beyond their 'theory' with the theses of historical materialism. The models of neo-classical economics do not and cannot apply to reality.

A New Communism should eschew premature theories to expose the flaws in the neo-classical brand. It is thus easy to 'luke skywalker' the core flaw in the whole game with a one-shot demolition exposing the contradiction

at the core of modern economics: no set of differential equations constitute a theory of economic action. The 'science' of economics is thus exposed as a preposterous 'damned new thing', mathematical ideology.

Feminism A streamlined Manifesto must not exclude issues of feminism and the challenge to the family.

The Family Will neo-communism embrace the Communist Manifesto's critique of the family?

Racism A recent movement called #BlackLivesMatter reminds us of the many parallel tracks of radical activism that a single focus can forget. We certainly won't forget: our monofocus on the issue of communism will actually end up more comprehensive...

Our model of history shows clearly the multitasking character of historical realization, and the clearest example is:

Abolitionism Our world histories will show clearly that parallel tracks emerge on the left: the classic cases are early Munzerian Christianity, Diggers to Levelers, and most of all the abolitionists whose work arose independently of leftist marxism and generated the lead up to the Civil War.

Nuclear Proliferation/Disarmament Any serious discussion of postcapitalism must take a stand on the question of nuclear technology, nuclear energy industries, and nuclear disarmament.

Radical Ecology Attempts to backdate ecological thinking to the marxist canon are of interest, but in the final analysis, using our new model of history, the left can correct the one-sided Enlightenment perspective (next to the six or more 'enlightenments' of the early modern) with the clear dialectical complement: the Romantic movement, rich in resources for an ecological neo-communism.

Israel Neo-communism in the US must vigorously expose the coup d'état of American politics by the Israeli lobbies, covert agencies, and Jewish public. The status of Israel in the wars of the Middle East must be assessed with a platform position on its gross rights violations constituting apartheid.

Non-violence A radical revolutionary movement is not required to embrace Gandhian non-violence, and should follow the standard of the

early democratic revolutions. The American Revolutionary War was not a pacifist movement, but a war of liberation.

9/11 Conspiracy The failure of the current lefts to expose the covert action behind the 9/11 false flag black op connected with a 'deep state' phenomenon threatens to indict them as accessories to state criminality. The whole set of issues going back to the onset of the CIA must be rigorous pursued.

Covert Agencies Modern government has been hijacked by the immense underworld of covert ops and their agents, now licensed by the state itself. This cancer must be brought into the open and rigorously controlled with the ideological cover of 'state secularity' and 'top secrecy' brought under control: the deep state must be exposed and eliminated...

#### A Core Draft of Our Manifesto

We have reached the stage of Powerpoint bullets for a core draft of a new manifesto, unembarrassed our codification falls short of the classic eloquence of Marx/Engels, if only it achieves a practical result. We leave the draft as is, better crude than newly dogmatic. Achieve the first stage of the abolition of private property and the result follows.

We can leave the manner of a stirring Manifesto in a virtual mode, but alert to the terror of the end times of the capital zone, in the realization of the coming steps to a new great transition. The hand is dealt. The future is open to a path beyond the era of the capitalist nightmare.

The incomplete list of propositions asserted by this can be yeasted from an ersatz list as below, to be formalized by a version of the Red Forty-eight Group (R48) Group.

The New Communism spawns a new political formation, the R48 Group, this an algebraic  $x$  for entities to be created by the Universal Class

The cultural and economic crisis of later capitalism has left an entire planetary system close to apocalypse.

We face the real question of whether not the Faustian pact with capitalism will end in species extinction. the pious sophistries of the denunciations of communism and the paeans to free market self-bankrupt

in the timely resolution of the prophetic starting point. But we should note the ambivalence of our two prophets, Marx/Engels: they saw the cogency of an interval of capitalist globalization, but they attempt via 1848 to act at once without delay to the new foundation of communism. Our delays here may prove fatal.

We must therefore take up the prophetic warnings of the dangerous future train wreck of capitalism, now present, and fulfill the injunction to foreclose on capital maniacs out of a horror novel. Are we too late? In a final swindle the capitalist powers have finessed a climate treaty that was bogus, and destined to non-passage by the truly terminal cases in the American Congress. We must point to the core issue and not succumb to social democratic illusions, our 'market' communism suggesting a way to do 'new dealism' right on the way to a full communism.

We have achieved in principle a 'dialectical balance' of opposites, communist with markets, communist with democratic aspects, strong authority to guard the revolution, but with an anarchist subcore. This system echoes the original ambiguity of the manifesto of Marx and Engels and can be extended to great length. An electoral path here would be ideal, but as the example of the American system shows, the 'so-called democracy' is so corrupted that no democracy is actually offered in order to reform the system.

But the overall project is not some utopian fantasy: it is essential a two stage process or evolution after the model of the American Revolution: a phase of rebellion against US/global imperialism and capitalism, and a foundational stage setting the axioms of a new Communism. The result is not mystical dreaming but a practical result that should have been accomplished long ago, as the era of 1848 proclaimed from the start.

Our Manifesto confronts first the climate emergency with a streamlined and minimalist version of the original vision of the year 1848. This takes from Marx and Engels the prophesied endgame of the expropriation of the bourgeoisie. The rush of calamity forces the hand of the futurists of communism. The time for that great revolution, the last, is here, now or never. The bourgeoisie in scofflaw indifference to so much as a minor mediation of its destructive ecological insanity has lost its right to the social predominance of unregulated markets. From the classic Manifesto:

The distinguishing feature of Communism is not the abolition of

property generally, but the abolition of bourgeois property. But modern bourgeois private property is the final and most complete expression of the system of producing and appropriating products, that is based on class antagonisms, on the exploitation of the many by the few.

In this sense, the theory of the Communists may be summed up in the single sentence: Abolition of private property.

With an eye to the failure of the Bolshevik episode, a New Communism might straddle of 'end of history' theme with a democratic revolution after the model of the American remorphed to a form of communism as democracy. The context is a global revolution against (American) imperialism next to the larger capitalist globalization, on the analog to the American rebellion against British colonialism, informed by the lessons of the failures of Bolshevism. The basic framework is that of the revolution of the early modern bringing communism to democracy, and democracy to communism.

Required is a passage a New Communism as the realization of a postcapitalist modernity. The outcome will be a globalizing version in two possible modes, as a full communism or as a transitional market neo-communism with a foundational abolition of private property, but an open question on planning/markets. If markets are socially owned, or if they are simply abolished at the end, the point is that this transitional framework can be to simply jettison the whole round of harebrained marxism, and yet able to use that and other resources as references.

The resulting political revolution moves to a global stage as a federation of socialist republics/democracies with separations of powers between the political and economic administration of state, a robust set of human rights given the subtraction of the classic liberal license as to markets. Planetary destruction in the free field of markets is not a right.

The social sphere might well set an indifference level of semi-anarchist culture at the low end with communal, agricultural and microeconomic particulars left to itself.

The New Communism should adopt a robust praxis freed from the obsession with theory that tended to stall the classic marxist legacy.

This format requires a new model of history, a new perspective on

historical materialism, a discussion of the infatuation with dialectics, and the secular equivalent of religion in the recognition of homo sapiens as superstitious ape with soul, will, ethical nature, complex consciousness, language and creative powers.

This project will deal with a superset of the working class as the Universal Class and mediate vanguardism and one party neo-bourgeois elitism with a conception of the Universal Class as the set of all classes, including all subsets of the universal set of classes, with singleton sets of individuals, each a class to himself, mediating individualism and group psychologies.

Although its trend toward the secular remains central, this is not a form of dogmatic materialism, atheism, or prejudice against the dialectic of idealism. Such a left might tip its hat to the first communists of the early modern, in the Peasant's Revolt of Münzer. The stance of the New Communists is to realize the full program of the modern transition in a complex dialectical spectrum as the realization of a new modernity beyond capitalism.

The basis for action is praxis in a reserve against theory, the bane of the elder marxism. We can model the path of this movement as either electoral or revolutionary with a model that remorphs the classic American revolution, with its two stages, a declaration and revolution, and a transition to constitutional foundations.

Note again that the American Rebs were not subject to any requirements of theory, belief, or religion. They didn't have to be idealists or materialists, theists or atheists. The action of revolution is not the application of theory to history, but the free agency of individuals who create economies, and who are free to replace them.

We suspect the whole apparatus of marxism is stalling any praxis at this point. Some of that legacy can be carried by the new group, and we can expect to inherit much of older cadre. The whole marxist canon is simple the Old Testament, an historical backdrop with its classic prophets, Marx and Engels. The new phase of global action needs a New Testament able to break the mechanics of frozen habit and robotic consciousness that overtakes all cultic forms of thought.

Our Manifesto is for a New Communism, and the qualification will serve to create a caesura with previous Internationales (all permutations of the Second) to recast the core paragraph we have cited from the original classic of Marx/Engels: the project of the expropriation of the bourgeoisie and capital in the creation of a new global federation of socialist republics able to rescue the world system from the runaway train of free markets in a terminal phase of social canceration.

There could be a dialectical negation of capitalism vis communism, and a further negation of communism via new third construct, neocommunism: itself a negation of both capitalist and communism... This action will pass as with Leninism via a vanguard from the Universal Class, itself a superset of the working class. This Universal Class must seek to create a global movement stirring the working classes of a whole planet: we may start with the Coltan miners of the Congo, to be positive definite...

We can leave the eloquence of a stirring Manifesto in a virtual mode to suggest the terror of the end times of the capital zone, in the realization of the coming steps to a new great transition. The hand is dealt. The future is open to a path beyond the era of the capitalist nightmare. The list of propositions asserted by this can be yeasted from an ersatz list as below, to be formalized by a version of the Red Forty-eight Group (R48) Group.

The New Communism spawns a new political formation, the R48 Group, this an algebraic  $x$  for entities to be created by the Universal Class

This formation uses a broader understanding of history beyond the economic and creates a superset of the path of marxism as a version of modernity and its revolutionary legacy, to become a floating fourth turning point, that is a new civilization created to succeed capitalism.

It seeks the electoral or revolutionary expropriation of the bourgeoisie/capital

The result can be a form of market communism on its way to a full neo-communist system

The result to become a national/international federation, but may certainly operate as one national unit]

Needed are a position on nuclear questions (disarmament), and aa

willingness to try and control population

It must deal with a no growth economy that is able to provide a basic income an indifference level below which people can live in a hybrid non-totalitarian mode with respect to the state

Market communism would surpass social democratic illusions by the abolition of private property, at the scale of the industrial level. This would be a constitutional question.

Market communism can have forms of publicly owned by private operated transitional structures that can operate in a mediated economy of regulated industries

Market communism must resolve the old (and often bogus) market calculation debates and rescue public thought from the sophisticated ideologies of mathematical neo-classical economics

Market communism can pass to a full communism based on a discovered form of realizable planning

The New Communism can allow a threshold level of small scale, petit bourgeoisie, and other residual formations to operate below a defined indifference point. Farms, communes (regional, urban, industrial, ...), etc. can evade totalization in a larger system.

The New Communism will be an ecological revolution

The New Communism must examine the legacy of covert ops, the destruction of democracy by the intelligence agencies of the previous era, and any successor strictly regulated in a public forum.

The format of revolution should remorph the double phases of any political transition, e.g. the model of the American Revolution: a revolt against an established power, and a constitutional phase moving to create the needed balance of democracy and republic, with a full and explicit set of rights.

Notes

Once and Future Communism



Discussions of communism require close theoretical examination of the issues of historical theory and of economic systems. But one problem that has arisen over time is the limited character of social theories and the tendency to cast them in the mode of physics, leaving the field to reductionist scientism. The legacy of marxism suffers this tendency, as does the evolutionism of Darwin. The legacy is so classic that it is almost better to leave it as is and to proceed instead to create a superset or dialectical continuation of the original. But we can provide a new model of history, one that is not a theory, and which can also be that superset. Before we do that let us consider that a model can be as confusing as a theory and we are entitled to set them aside for the main event: the construction via praxis of postcapitalist society and economy.

We need a view of history based on ‘free agency’ and simple periodization without the attempt produce a close theory. Once we renounce grand theories they reemerge via simple chronologies as spectacle of world epochs, with a dash of evolutionism in the background: the stage of last and first men.

Is the critique of Darwinism relevant beyond distraction at a point of crisis? The right has a twin forked strategy: social Darwinism disguised behind a robust critique of darwinian fundamentalism. And this is not the same as creationist anti-science. The left should resume Marx’s instant expose of the ‘science’ of Darwin. This can be achieved easily in neutral by looking at the empirical chronology of evolution as a fact in deep time, leaving a theory of evolution, still another ‘theory’, to the future. This will allow a more robust view of the dynamics of revolution in history.

The issue of economics is beset by the way that the subject rapidly changed gears after the period of Marx toward ‘neoclassical’ or marginalist economics, and this has been insufficiently studied by students on the left. A further development was the onset of the so-called ‘calculation debate’ that has thrown the proponents of planning on the defensive. The stance of ‘market’ communism can adopt a failsafe simplification of full communism as a constitutional foundation of property returned to the Commons, whatever the status of explicit industrial corporation under that axiom. Here the Labor Theory of Value has suffered a marginalist sophistry, one that can be countered by once again setting aside theory for a descriptive analysis: a theory of value defeated the marxists, a point under debate to be sure, but a simple solution is available: restate the issue as a perspective of

praxis, not theory. That is, the working class is subject to wage theft by the action of Capital. Done, that simple.

A New Communism must deal with these issues and that requires a kind of detachment from the constant reiteration of boilerplate Marx and his somewhat dubious theories from the era of classical economics. Here again theory is a distraction. As rough historical accounts these issues are Old Testament fodder. But one must be wary of 'theories', and such have been the object of almost constant refutation by bourgeois ideologists. If leftists eschew 'theory' they can focus on the 'theories' of the bourgeois economists with devastating effect. The original Marx was keenly aware of the interaction of theory and ideology and the left should be wary of themselves falling in the trap. Marx's Capital is inspirational but an incomplete train wreck that is not fully coherent. If the left would avoid the constant truck in theories and simply move to expose those of the capitalist ideologies, they would be a step ahead. Instead the left tends to regurgitate the material of the classic period unaware of the considerable amount of refutation literature that arose almost immediately.

Class struggles, German Ideologies The early Marx and Engels are almost all that is needed to recast the basis for a future communism. This was the point of the emergence of historical materialism as a theory. It would work much better as a form of descriptive social photography, snapshots of the interaction of class, ideology, and the high/low of these interactions, without the mumbo jumbo of superstructure and base. The latter works perfectly in editorial mode, but fails as a theory due to its overly deterministic cast.

The marxist canon has a stodgy but effective set of nemeses, one of them Karl Popper whose thesis of 'historicism', next to Isaiah Berlin's theses on 'historical inevitability', and they have made their point. We can't safely factor out the issue of 'free agency' from the discussion of historical and economic systems.

It is useful to challenge the theory of historical materialism with a different model of world history. The contraction of thought to positivistic materialism and reductionism scientism in the wake of the era of the Hegel school is a notable background of the era of Marx and Engels in the 1840's. The basic theory of Marx and Engels arising in the period The German Ideology was a guide to a profound insight into the relationship of economic

action and historical action. But as with most theories the result always falls short of the complexity of history.

We should avoid the deletion of free agency from accounts of history and economics. In this context, economic systems cease to be deterministic system, rather the constructs of free agents who are free to deconstruct them.

We will offer a new model of history based on the perception of the so-called 'eonic' or 'macro' effect. The result is not a theory, but an advisory, and an empirical construct showing a suggestive solution to the problem of historical dynamics. The result is non-dogmatic, but can help to unify thinking around a generalized timeline. The result suggests a solution to the evolution/history paradox uses 'systems modeling' to stand beyond materialism, idealism unifies all socio-historical categories: religion, science, politics, even art histories, gives a hint to the solution to the 'end of history' propaganda shows how to consider 'modernity' as a unified 'transition' is based on ideas that are commonly shared, e.g. the idea of 'modernity', the tendency to refer to the 'middle ages', the 'axial age', etc...

This can free marxists from the confused analyses of feudalism, and the ambiguity as to the onset of 'capitalism'.

The whole model can be set aside and simply become a chronicle of the visible progression of rough epochs climaxing in modernity.

The new model of history presented later in this book uses the distinction of 'system action' and 'free action', the latter being either 'free agency' or, if we care to make the case, free will. Marxists seem to forget one half of their legacy, the work of the Kantian ethical socialists who stormed onto the scene during the period of the early Second Internationale. A New Communism needs to free itself from the sterile positivism of that period, mindful of the way the Kantian thematic can fall into the hands of reactionary thinkers such as Bernstein who discredited the legacy of Kant, beside the already considerable confusion over idealism.

The tide of the industrial revolution spawned the world of proletariats and Marx's brilliant invocation of the working class was a breakthrough concept for its period but as we enter late capitalism the class structure of the societies in question has shifted. The proletariats are mostly external outsourced entities, the indigenous working class being the object of massive

attempts at social conditioning. A new left might turn the tables here with a more general conception of the Universal Class, which is really the same as the working class but more inclusive of the many subsets of the set of classes: much of the legacy is about a cliché factory bound working class. But the real spearhead of revolution has shifted now to a random mixture of many sorts, from the new kind of lumpenproletariat to the multiple factions of the petit bourgeoisie. The action of appeal should address the whole of the working class, which is the complement of the bourgeoisie. The classic canon in invoking the 'working class' tended to exclude an immense number of people including many who are the most probable stalwarts of revolutionary action.

A further issue is the confused legacy of 'dialectic'. We used the term correctly above to refer to a dyadic contrast of opposites, or a debate. The curious mysticism of the dialectic inherited from Hegel (whose thinking sprang from occult and mystical sources) was later said to not straddle the social and the natural. It is perhaps a correct inference from Hegelian usage, but the original sources of dyadic/triadic logics, e.g. in the Samkhya of antiquity, proposed a universal materialism of triadic factors that encompass the cosmic totality. We discuss this in the notes to the Preface in the Appendix.

Marxism arose in the era of the onset of positivism and contracted around a brittle materialism and a reductionist view of history that has been left behind by a larger culture that has expanded globally to include a wide spectrum of cultural perspectives. The views of those proposing the scientism of the period of the Iron Cage no longer satisfy, and this negative judgment falls on the legacy of socialist thought. And it became a vehicle of darwinian ideology despite Marx's clear warnings of the ideological character and social darwinist illusions of Darwinism.

Modernity, and the End of History What is modernity? The present generation is suffering through what could be the terminal crisis of civilization in the context of climate change, an unfolding calamity whose implications defy the axioms of modernity itself, or so it seems. But beyond that lies the reality of a civilization undermined by its own success, economic success, so-called, a success that is really a disguise for a deeper failure, along with an ideological rigidity so complete no insight into the problem is possible. The blindness to the issue of climate change is symptomatic of

this larger failure.

**Postmodern Illusions** In a postmodern vein many critics of modernity, from reactionary perspectives, have indicted it as a whole, but a closer look shows the crisis is not really that of modernity, but of the realization of its axioms and the subtle derailment of the original impulse. It is not hard to document the drift from democracy to empire in the American system whose appearance was such a classic early triumph of modernity. And the status and future of capitalism was directly foreseen by the successors to the French Revolution whose intimations of a last revolution 'beyond capitalism' was picked up by Marx and Engels whose codification is now a classic legacy, if somewhat dated now. But the point was clear: capitalism had suddenly hijacked modernity and we can see that this diagnosis is as relevant today as it was at the start. We see all the elements of class, ideology, and capitalist economics produced a cancer in the unfolding of globalization, and this charge is now rendered in grim black and white at a point where the last phase of neoliberalism is violently out of control and in denial about its own effects.

**History and (R)evolution** We need a new perspective on history, one that can at once clarify the issue of historical dynamics and this in the context of the various theories of evolution that have foundered in the same kind of reductionism as the marxist. Here the theory of revolution has suffered the misleading use of dialectic to explicate the revolutionary phenomenon arising in modernity. We make a dramatic shift to a new evolutionary perspective, this time starting with world history which shows a concealed developmental pattern. Marx was one of the first critics of darwinian random evolution, but later marxism adopted it dogmatically. The theory needs to be exposed as an ideology to set the left on the course to a real science of evolution. History can help. But he did not believe in 'meta-history' or directed historical patterns. But the evidence is clear. The question of evolutionary change has often been confronted with the idea of discontinuity (often from religious sources) while historical analysis has tended to avoid this. But the issue of revolution raises the question all over again, although here there can be confused over the dynamic involved. Leftists in the tradition of Marx have sometimes tried to use the 'dialectic' to create a model of this, but this raises the question of the meaning of the dialectic.

**The Enigma of the Axial Age** The key to the enigma is the evidence of

the Axial Age. Starting in the nineteenth century one of the most remarkable discontinuities in history began to be observed, and this was later codified by Karl Jaspers as the Axial Age. This data has all the provocative ambiguity that besets analysis with religious obsessions, but the nature of the data actually forces the issue of looking at the process of discontinuity more abstractly. The idea of discontinuity can be very treacherous, but if we see a massive impetus of changes over a short interval with no antecedent causal factor we have the grounds for a new type of explanation. In fact, the Axial Age shows us something even more remarkable: a whole spectrum of discontinuous intervals in synchronous parallel. The complexity of this phenomenon advises caution even as it forces us to consider exotic new models.

A New Model of History The Axial Age confronts us with something conventional historiography has tended to avoid and we are forced to attempt a new form of explanation to deal with the data that world history began to show for the first time in the nineteenth century as the data for a history of civilization began to emerge from archaeological research. The understanding of the Axial Age, despite the additional mystery of its parallelism, emerges as that of a step in a sequence: with the basic clues we can easily complete the analysis to discover, or suspect a larger sequence.... We move forward and backwards, and the puzzle, despite the lack of sufficient data for a full solution, shows the obvious appearance of a sequence, with Egypt/Sumer as a first visible step, and modernity coming later. This gives us a three term sequence, and a clear, but not quite definite, prior set of steps for the sequence in the Neolithic. Once we grapple with the huge data set for this phenomenon, a generalization of the Axial Age, a kind of recognition occurs: we see at once a 'macro' dynamic behind continuous history, and this fulfills the definition of a kind of 'discrete/continuous' model, operating via a set of epochal intervals and their initializing transitions. The nature of the parallelism in the Axial Age is still unclear but the overall timing of the Axial Age falls into place and in addition shows us the clue to modernity: it is an integrated transition of epochal timing in a larger dynamic of world history. We can see why leftists were so close but unable to put their finger on the nature of what they saw as a new era of modernity, taken incorrectly as the dawn of capitalism. We can see that capitalism is one phenomenon associated with the rise of modernity, and takes off near the end of its basic 'transition', but the two are not the same. In fact, one reason for this is the appearance of the antithesis in parallel, the idea of (democratic) socialism/communism.

The Modern Transition We begin to see the solution to the ‘revolution’ riddle: revolutions appear in the modern transition, which is itself a larger kind of revolution. But the latter is a comprehensive spectrum of many innovations. We have found the basis for understanding the enigma of modernity: it is a finite transition in a larger sequence and shows a termination point or ‘divide’ around 1800+: this key issue is vital for seeing the later chaotification now overtaking a whole planet.... We have found a discrete series with epochal intervals stretching ca. 3000 BCE, 600 BCE, and 1800, with around three centuries of prior transition. We see at once that the interval from 1500 to 1800 is the relevant. An at first incomprehensible property of this situation is the divide period around 1800 (plus or minus). Note the massive number of innovations of this period, over and above those of the earlier transition. This ‘divide’ point is a mysterious clue to the dynamic of modernity, and shows the analog to similar data in the Axial period. Note the parallel appearance of the American, French Revolutions, the Industrial Revolution and its associated capitalism, and just the moment after the appearance of challenges to capitalism, the revolutions of 1848, and the appearance of a dialectical complement of double futures. This situation is exactly analogous to the prior period in the wake of the Axial Age as parallel outcomes began to compete for the future. This is not a deterministic system with a set outcome. Its outcome could be called ‘dialectical’ in that two or more outcomes attempt to create or seize the future.

The Dialectic of Capitalism We must be wary of the term ‘dialectic’, in its confusions of Hegelianism, and the ambiguity of dyadic and triadic versions, but we can restrict its usage to very simple definitions to see the value of ‘antithesis generating a future beyond contrasts’. Let us create en passant another usage here with an example. The term ‘dialectic’ is subject to many confusions, although we should try to adopt transparent usages because the idea, prior to abuse, can be useful. For example, the modern transition shows outcomes that are ‘dialectical’, which simply means that two or more outcomes emerge in potential and/or in parallel. We thus see capitalism emerging with a parallel synchronous process, e.g. the democratic revolutions evolving into socialist/communist resolutions... The dialectic should refer to such ‘counterpoint’ opposites and not indulge in mystical triads... The dialectic of dyads versus triads is hopelessly confused by marxists, and we should use only the simplest dyads until and unless we can find a better or larger understanding... We confront the appearance of an immense period of philosophy from Kant to Hegel just at the point of our divide in

a spectacular display. The idea of the dialectic arises from Hegel, passes into the materialist marxism, and begins to suffer confusions as to its real meaning. We see the creation of an enigmatic subject by Engels: dialectical materialism, a very controversial probably pseudo-scientific formulation, but one that is an echo of an ancient and similar subject, the Samkhya of India. We cannot safely resolve the issue of triads and dialectic and need to adopt safe foundational logics, e.g. the Aristotelian logic of science, for any statements of analysis, but we can see that dialectical materialism is a train wreck version of an ancient set of intuitions, most remarkable. But the inventors of this, the marxists, need to be wary of this curious subject with its mystical whiplash. We have found one safe way to proceed: we use the term 'dialectic' as a dyad, a contrast of opposites or counterpoints given empirically as historical facts. Taking empirically as historical description of dyads the dialectic can find a useful and safe first new draft of the brilliantly confused codification of Engels. But we must be wary: we cannot safely use 'dialectic' for theoretical deductions, e.g. to deduce the logic of revolution.

1848: The Prophetic Year As crude as our model is, we arrive at a spectacular result. The divide process at the end of the modern transition extends through the first generation after around 1800, and this period, with a symbolic drama altogether apt ca. the 1848 revolutions, with Marx, Engels et al in attendance (we should include the counterpoint dialectic of anarchist synchronous actors, e.g. Bakunin).

Our model tells us that the onset of socialism/communism is parallel to that of capitalism just at the divide to the modern transition and both aspects have the appearance of apparitions, i.e. appear at the last moment and tend to contradict the long early modern preparation. Capitalism begins to distort modernity, as socialism/communism attempt a 'chase plane' pursuit and response. Both aspects show the ominous transition from system action to free agency characteristic of our model and both aspects are liable to distortion. Capitalist distortion is obvious from start to finish. The marxist left produces a powerful corpus in response, but this factor of free agency is a warning that we are dealing with fallible agents. We might suspect the influence of positivism, which had a clear critique in the early modern, scientism, Darwinism, reductionism, and preposterously, the Hegelian dialectic. The overall result is flawed and has no correct theory of revolution...the Russian Bolshevik revolution proceeds with inadequate theories and is different in character from the revolutions of the early



modern...We see that the emergence of a 'new kind of revolution' in the wake of the French, American revolutions, and the spooky onset of tidal wave capitalism are part of the divide period at the end of a macro transition, and almost simultaneously our system spawns a chase plane dialectic in the various communistic (but their own complement anarchist) attempts to claim the future beyond the 'standard outcome of modernity' captured at the last moment by capitalist globalization.

The Ends of History The end of history debate is related to this issue of the 'last and first men', but has been distorted upside down to make capitalism that 'end'. But surely the original and true meaning is that of a system to succeed the capitalist phase, and this without voiding the basic democratic outcome of the modern transition.... The model of history we have developed can easily resolve the confusion over the end of history by reminding us that the 'ends of history' tend to cluster in our macrosequence, and the period after that is not fully predetermined by that model. The 'ends of history' are simply given in the dialectic complement of capitalism and communism. Our fate depends on the resolution of that paradox, and the early innings went to the capitalist defeat of communism. But the next inning we can see is the need to deal with the catastrophe being generated by capitalism...The question of the 'end of history' reverts to its original form: the future as something beyond capitalism...

Floating fourth turning points We can leave the last two sections in potential, but with a new metaphor of the 'last revolution', the floating fourth turning point, i.e. the generation of whole cultural wholes on the scale of the macrosequence: The macro model suggests a generalization of 'revolution': floating fourth turning points' (after the three known epochs in succession in the macrosequence), as cultural transformation at the level of replicating the early modern, but in a postcapitalist version...Here is the beautiful logic of our new model of history: it is an interplay of system action and free agency. We have seen three broad turning points or transitions emerging from the longer sequence from the Neolithic or before. But our free agency allows us to confront the destined decline into madness of the modern rendered a dead zone of economic insanities. Our options include a new social technology of the future become our present, a floating fourth turning point of our own free activity...It must replicate the action of greater

history itself and realize a new modern in the ear of postcapitalism.

Last and First Men A New Communism must stage a society able to cradle the future evolution of man, and this question far outstrips the current study of biological evolution. The first stage is to replace the ideological cancer of social darwinist evolutionism with a neutral evolutionary saga freed from reductionist scientism. This is a supreme challenge and instantly puts the strongest scrutiny on this and any other neo-communist project. This is a useful discipline for a movement that cannot trust itself in its critical mistrust of the immense deceptions of the capitalist era. We can leave this section incomplete and consider our notes a kind of generator for a virtual manifesto on its way to realization. Beside our single citation from the original manifesto we field a single idea behind our review of the marxist canon: the need to de-mechanize thought and recast the rich potential of the successors of 1848 for a new era of crisis. We can cite here a continuation via the text of Last and First Men.

### A New Model of History: The Modern Epoch

We see the way to a new model of history as a rational account getting misled by 'theories' with their liabilities. We can easily restate the basics of historical materialism in this context. We can proceed with an empirical chronology suggested by history itself, and this can help us disentangle from the 'end of history' propaganda that has so confused the discussion of capitalism. In the process we can adopt the challenge given by Kant in his essay on history. That classic essay is forgotten as the hidden task behind first Hegel then the proponents of historical materialism, followed by the dealers of the 'end of history' meme, mostly dealing in Jokers in a rigged deck. If we can provide a superior version resolving that challenge, we can reestablish the basics of marxism in another fashion. In fact, we have a century and a half of archaeological breakthrough research under our belt, which neither Hegel nor Marx had. Armed with that we can do a recursion of Kant's assigned task, throw light on the issue of teleological, discover what Kant called 'nature's secret plan' along with a demonstration of the 'progression toward a perfect civil constitution'. Our manifesto must thus be a statement about that progression toward a better civil constitution, not yet perfect, but able to reconcile the issues of economics, democracy and communism that have a fanned curve ball for liberal ideologists.

Marxism brought into existence a debatable tendency to make 'revolution' a matter of applied theory when in fact it should be more like the case of the American revolution: Rebs 'mad as heck' applying a constitutional praxis to the conclusion of a rebellion. A theory is an illusion it will master hypercomplexity. Modern economics is a series of mathematical theories that are mostly bogus, and Marx in *Capital* tried to propose a rival, a losing proposition, despite the many insights of that masterwork, also a doorstopper. Their earlier work was more practical and all we need. We should not compete with theories, but adopt provisional models, and leave the burden of proof to the propagandists of *Capital*, that is say, the burden of no proof and the almost chaplinesque parodies of calculus that grace the modern economic illusion sphere.

Note that every in reality follows this approach: biologists claim to have a theory of evolution but in fact use a chronology of evolutionary history, empirically. Economists makes all sorts of claims about capitalism in theory but a close look at any textbook shows that all those graphs are just bits of model construction. No general theory exists (because of complexity and free agency). So what we are doing is being honest about simply applying an empirical chronology. There we see that economic systems are dwarfed by the larger systems at work. That is good: because that means that revolutionary change is possible: we can decide to change an economic system.

A program of action is a recipe based on the choices of free agents. No theory is required: it is a constructivist procedure: the constitution of a civil new republic as a political economy. This small difference between a theory, a model and a recipe or praxis makes all the difference and is the proper subject matter of a manifesto. We can propose a simple model of history that will also throw light on the issue of evolution. A model is not a theory. Even so it might seem itself theoretical. If the material is too arcane we can set it aside. It is an attempt at explanation which is not a theory. We do not propose applying a theory about history to a revolutionary version of 'applied sociology'. Theories of social systems always fail, and historical materialism is no exception. But Marx/Engels nearly got it right with a model of progressive epochs...feudalism, capitalism...But this is another theory. We can adopt a related but simpler approach: world history shows the evidence of a progression of successive epochs, the most recent being modernity. We see an epoch starting around 3300/3000 BCE in Sumer and Egypt then the epoch of the Axial Age starting around 900/600 BCE the

modern epoch starting around 1500/1800

These epochs clearly show the way to resolving Kant's challenge, and show a progression toward better civil constitutions. We suspect this progression starts far earlier, but can't be sure. We are on the verge of a monster theory, but without more data we can't produce one, so we use an incomplete model of world epochs. We thus consider how to proceed with a simple model of three epochs, the third of which was getting under way as Marx/Engels produced their quite epochal Manifesto. Instead of theory we proceed with some simple observations and hunches: history is structured, has a directional aspect, isn't by inspection isn't determined by economics, shows 'evolving systems' in many varieties developing under a pattern of feedback, etc... Most of all we suspect we are seeing a teleological system in action. Now we know why theories are failures: they are mostly 'causal' constructs and can't reckon directionality. We won't produce a theory of teleology, but our model will reflect it empirically. We are out of the morass that sank so many historical theories.

Seeing the period 1500/1800 as the interval of epochal transition is the master clue, in reality a cogent case, to what Marx/Engels were trying to put their finger on.

So the issue is not the epoch of communism to replace capitalism replacing feudalism, but the blend of capitalism (or the Industrial Revolution) and communism to cap the realization of modernity and its trend toward democracy. The confusion arose perhaps because of the way figures like Adam Smith misgeneralized the action of free markets with the ethical transvaluation based self-interest turned into a theory about history and economics. There may be some empirical truth to his insights, but as a theory they fail.

The epoch in question is modernity: how we realize it depends on our application of its core elements of innovation: democracy, freedom, market capitalism, socialism, etc... The fate of Rome in the prior epoch of the Axial Age shows us how badly free agency can screw up the potential of historical realization. The result was so a kilter that a chase plane rescue operation emerged to try and recompute the epochal downfield, Christianity. We call this a 'floating fourth turning point', or an attempt to restart an epoch, a bit grandiose, but a way to generalize the idea of 'revolution', and to see how

they can fail around their inherent limits.

This is what a revolution must aspire to: a new culture beyond a new economy, based on the corrected elements of epochal transition. Jargon, jargon, but our point here is clear: our epoch is modernity with a distorted economic outcome requiring a floating fourth turning point. That's enough: you can skip the rest here and move to the next section. I recommend my model of history, but one can proceed without it.

### Theories, Models, Ideologies

Having used the term 'dialectic' we will be wary of its use: it is a fallacy emerging from Hegel that a dialectical dynamic operates in history. There may be some finesse that can rescue the idea, but our approach is different, and sometimes comes close, but we should be wary of mixed modes. Beside this is the legacy of historical materialism with its concepts of economic determinations in history. One thing seems suspiciously the case: theories are always wrong, and one reason is the complexity of the subject matter, and another the misuse of causality after the fashion of physics, that is the fallacy of scientism. Theories of history are clearly at fault here. What is the domain of discourse? Because history is connected to evolution, the answer is, everything since the big bang! A system far too complex for a theory. We can demonstrate without much trouble, in defiance of conventional wisdom that the theory of Darwin is 'still another false theory'. Marx had a funny work around here, evident in the Manifesto: a thesis of the progression of epochs, from feudalism to capitalism to communism. But while this works descriptively it is still another failed theory. Feudalism and capitalism are different categories; it might be argued. And feudalism occurs intermittently in ancient history, consider the dark ages before archaic Greece.

How proceed? Our model adopts an empirical approach, and asks if we can detect large scale patterns in history. In fact, we can. Or else we can simply ask if history shows evidence of a dynamic. The two questions converge on the data in the affirmative as if we were attempt to decode history by asking if it shows a cyclical pattern. We can find that! But we can only see it over a short range, which prevents the creation of a theory. Next to this we must grand the factor of free agency in the execution of history. No determinate differential equation will work here. And it is. But we are

close to creating a viable path: to best of our knowledge history shows a progression of epochs, and these transcend sub-distinctions of economic history, technological history, and these epochs are fuzzy outlines not contradicted by the factor of free agency. And these epochs appear clearly to show a transitional phase at their onset filled with innovations. We arrive at a framework to proceed: modernity is a phase in the onset of a new epoch, and shows the massive flux of innovations typical of epochal transitions, and this includes the crystallization of that distinct economic/technological complex set of innovations called 'capitalism' (granting that this is relative, capitalism being definably present throughout history as truck and barter).

This is very useful: there is no capitalist epoch. Economic systems do not determine the course of history. The whole game is executed by free agents, and the capitalist system was created by free agents who can replace that as free agents with a better system. Capitalism is a massive mega-innovation of the modern epoch. So why would we want to change it, isn't it canonically epochal? We see one reason for the stubborn dogma of capitalist fundamentalist axioms. The answer is simple: capitalism is not a system with a theory, but an series of ad hoc innovations, one of which is the idea of socialism/communism which emerged in tandem and which drives the system to realize still other innovations, ideas of freedom, democracy, just social systems, etc...We see that the epochal transition entered a new epoch with its emergent format still incomplete for precisely the reason such as Marx/Engels asserted: contrary tendencies must work themselves out, and a finalized 'modern' format could only emerge in the wake of globalization and some degree of development fueled by capitalism.

We the power of this kind of descriptive historical model: we are certainly on the verge of a massive new dose of 'theory', but in fact are stopped by incomplete data! We can simply use the history of free agents in rough epochs as a chronology of the development of civilization. We suspect, we note in passing, that our progression of epochs reaches back to the Neolithic or before.

What about the question of classes, and the history of classes struggles? That translates easily into our framework: we see the rough equality of Paleolithic man yield to the onset of class structures in the Neolithic and the subsequent eras of the State. The latter is especially evident in the epoch beginning with the classic phases of Sumer and Egypt. The contradictory

elements of freedom in the state (the state was however ambiguous a positive innovation of that epoch) gestates with its opposite, freedom from the state, with the former too frequently winning out throughout that era. But with dramatic precision we see the pole of 'freedom from the State' emerge with the birth of democracy in the Axial epoch.

So the thematic of the history of class struggle gets an instant foundation in our model. The point is the obvious issue of equality realization as class struggle. Our system shows this is a larger process of induction. No other model can suggest this: that themes of freedom, and equality are generated in the system's core dynamics. That was a confusion of many economic interpretations of history, e. g. that slavery was part of an economic inevitability. But at no point in the innovation structure of our epochs do we see an induction of slavery in some teleological sense. Slavery is a distortion of freedom in the State by free agents attempting to apply a proto-capitalist logic to the application of the extraction of surplus value. A distortion of freedom logic. This makes 'slavery' a disease of civilization. Note that the term capitalism is so vague we no theory could be consistent. It is a complex that must be described in chronological accounts. And we should note how easily free agents can distort transitional innovations: compare the account of the innovations of Adam Smith with the distorted muddle of dystopian 'market ideology' that arises in his wake.

We have all the elements for a highly flexible interpretative model approach to historical that places the onset of communism inside the overlapping revolutionary/democratic innovations and the capitalist economic innovation nexus. We can even bring in the banished concept of 'dialectic' by noting that our disillusion with theories is borne out by the facts: our 'system' is perfectly compatible with multiple outcomes in parallel attempting to reconcile complex counterpoints: democracy and economy. Since 'dialectic' is another failed theory, we should call it something else, and be clear our usage is simply descriptive. In such a system emergent parallels will tend to compete for the future. Here the 'theory' of revolution is replaced with an empirical perspective: the sudden appearance of the phenomenon of 'revolution' in the early modern falls like ripe fruit into the category of 'epochal innovations'.

That gives us a glimpse of a new model of history, and in the process it is also a corrective on our ideas of evolution, an issue better explored in

appendix. It allows an account of the emergence of freedom, and is best placed inside the Kantian Question about history. This is very controversial for many, but we should note that 'evolution' is so often confused with darwinian 'random emergence by natural selection' that it is hard to see its real meaning, which should be equivalent to 'development'. Biologists resist this because it makes 'evolution' teleological, but the attempt to banish teleology in the name of physics has backfired with 'evolution'. Our model shows directionality in history as a generalization of teleology: we can see that epochs in succession shows direction. We may not be able to fully analyze this because teleology is another failed theory, rather a descriptive tendency, and also because the factor of 'free agency' is required to complete the setting of direction and may fail in this, or decide to do something else. Evolution as directed development makes sense out of all the nonsense suffered by biologists in the attempt to make a science of life. It is resisted among reasons because teleology is mysterious and not subject so far to complete scientific accounts. So the drama of endless failed theories will continue. We must in the end invoke what physicists themselves suspect, a kind of Goldilocks principle that makes the question of evolutionary directionality implicit from the start. We should be mindful of our strategy, which stands wary of theories and simply observe a system of epochal transitions, unsure as we are embedded in its middles that we know its endpoint. Surely this question answers itself: the 'end of history' meme hints that as freedom is realized man steps out of the historical of epochal progressions into a free future of his own creation, the clichés here suddenly work!





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## DEMOCRATIC MARKET NEO-COMMUNISM

At a time of developing climate catastrophe it is important to bring to the fore the challenge of revolutionary change. There is no reason why this can't be followed with an electoral path, but the implications are and remain that of constitutional renewal. This approach, even as it can and should inform mainstream activist logic working on issue initiatives and electoral options, is a discipline of thinking on problems holistically, involving social, economic, constitutional and political perspectives in the context of a totalitarian capitalist regime, with global domination as its keynote. Our perspective is thus both nationalistic and internationalist. The times require the dangerous passage of revolutionary regime change, even if this provokes an apparently unrealistic goal, and this must at least be contemplated as a potential option.

The current election of Trump suggests the american system has entered the kind of reactionary deadlock that has too often cursed its history, witness the period leading up to the american civil war. The reign of climate deniers coming the fore simply amplifies an already disastrous situation, created by the american 'rogue state' with its imperialist wars fueled by the

military-industrial complex, its deep state and uncontrolled covert agencies showing strong evidence of false-flag dark ops, next to a corrupt political system beholden to capital interests. The developing crisis of climate change confronting a political system unable to respond shows a system entering the critical zone. The current system is not stable and we need to consider the dangers in the situation we face. If nothing else the revolutionary option is failsafe logic, the ready fire-extinguisher. But 'if nothing else' is not enough as the failure of the powers of be calls for intervention. It is also possible the imputation of revolutionary change can lead to preemptive change on the part of the established regime.

It is important to consider the revolutionary option and to declare in advance what the aims of revolution should be. This is nothing less than what the founders of the american system suggested might be needed, 'a republic if you can keep it'. Democracies emerged in revolutionary periods of turbulence and the founding fathers anticipated the future of this reality. Here we will propose a hybrid of democratic and socialist models in the form of what we call 'democratic market neo-communism'.

Here the legacy of marxism is both the best and the worst of possibilities. The public will not accept a canon of marxism in its classic form, although this could change. It remains an crucial resource taken historically. We can list some issues that will force a caesura from the marxist legacy:

- the bolshevik/stalinist outcome of the Russian revolution

- the limits of classical economics used by Marx

- the failure to consider neo-classical economics and its ideology

- exclusive emphasis on the working class rather than the 'universal class'

- the confusions of historical materialism and its stages of production theory

The key problem is that of theories of highly non-linear complexities that require empirical approximations. We will suggest a different historical framework in a short set of notes to the main section. The core of marxist thinking can be adapted to our loose historical model. The reader is ready to go in five minutes with this substitute for theory using

a simple chronology of epochs. We must displace the marxist core to the status of Old Testament to a New Testament restating a key set of ideas, and here the idea of communism, recast as neo-communism, is the best candidate if the proposal can sever its link to bolshevism, and work in the context of democratic logic. The older legacies remain important as reference sources, but we need a streamlined restatement that has divorced itself from stalinist idiocy.

We have proposed therefore a new ultra simple non-theoretical perspective on world history and a return to the era of the emergence of communism in the era of early Marx/Engels. We can focus on their classic Manifesto. But we must restate the issues in a new way and we can't cut and past marxist boilerplate as a procedure. We propose a simple nexus of ideas, and this centers around what we can democratic market neo-communism.

We can cite the material on this from *Toward a New Communist Manifesto* (pdf, Amazon), and *Last and First Men*, as a companion discussion, and this can serve as the bare starting point for a balanced version of a postcapitalist system. We should re-emphasize the need for an ecological communism and this requires a new view of history and culture, one easily adapted to our different take on world history.

This essay is short, a gesture toward a longer discussion, and a way to jolt thinking into a dialectic on the revolutionary prospect. We have clipped the material to outline form to jumpstart a new line of thinking about the crisis we face. We must act now, within a time frame of less than a decade to be ready for what we face.

### **Democratic Market neo-communism: a short sketch...**

We will with the core idea of the classic Manifesto of Marx and Engels:

...The distinguishing feature of Communism is not the abolition of property generally, but the abolition of bourgeois property. But modern bourgeois private property is the final and most complete expression of the system of producing and appropriating products, that is based on class antagonisms, on the exploitation of the many by the few. In this sense, the theory of the Communists may be summed up in the single sentence: Abolition of private property... *From the Communist Manifesto*

Communism/socialism has many confused representations, ours will

attempta to create a very broad blueprint that reconciles many opposites:

The details will be left out as we combine two ideas: the abolition of private property with a system deliberately balancing a set of opposites: planning, markets, top down control, bottom up semi-anarchist autonomy...Many discussions of communism confuse the foundational logic of expropriation with the creation of a particular economic system. But the two issues are not the same: a communist system founded in a constitutional starting point can then proceed to construct an economic system to match. There is no inherent reason why a communist system can't adopt experimental hybrid in a transition to a new kind of neo-communist economic system. Our references imply a discussion of the US system and yet invokes a transnational system.

1. step one is the expropriation of the bourgeoisie, at the high end. We leave a lower threshold to semi-autonomy, subject to regulation. Property, i.e. industrial macro projects, belong to the Commons. All natural resources belong to the Commons. This distinction is important because the control of economic resources by a one-party state is highly undesirable: a separation of powers requires a set of economic bodies, legal and practical, to regulate economic issues.

2. the executive power consists of a strong state that guards the revolution, protects the Commons, but which otherwise has limited powers which are delegated to different branches of government. This sector with be a one party or zero party state, republican with a president and set of guardians, and an elected president. This branch of government requires additional revolutionary challenges to the vices and excesses of authoritarian governments. This requires a global transnationalism in the midst of a communist nationalism, a commitment to a new globalization of states beyond imperialism, robust versions of free trade that are liberated from the capitalist brands of exploitation and out-sourced working classes, and the abolition and reconstitution of all covert agencies and their false-flag conspiracies. The market sector must be divorced completely from military capitalism. The 'deep state' must be exposed, neutralized and replaced with an open system with established laws as to surveillance, ideological mind control, and political deceptions.

3. a congress (and/or Senate) and a set of courts based on multiparty democracy that is completely free of big money of any kind. It will be

meritocratic, with short elections, state sponsored advertising on an equal basis, etc...: creating a reformed democracy given the grotesque distortions of the american example. This combination of one-party and multi-party systems is a unique innovation requiring careful consideration of its draft status in the realization of an open society in the context of a superset with strong but limited authority.

4. a set of economic institutions and courts to match will mediate the issues of development projects, allocations, planning...the central state will not be allowed to muddle through this sector which operates with a separation of powers. This set of legal bodies must include an ecological court mediating the economic impacts of industrial activity. This overall framework will mediate three sectors of the macroeconomy:

5. the resulting macro economy will be a hybrid of state corporations and entrepreneurial startups created by individuals with licenses to operate with ecological resources.

6. there is a lower threshold below which a high degree of autonomy is left to balance the anarchist pole of the equation. This sector can show many combinations of small-economy/communes/farms/NGO's etc...

7. the system must have strong authority next to a democratic core with rights and liberties and a populist program that deals with labor, education, medicine ( these probably free), housing, employment in populist emphases, and move beyond the sterile anti-liberalism of earlier communists.

This system requires many additional details but our snapshot is an attempt to generate a way to break old habits to think in a new way. As the text of *Toward a New Communist Manifesto* are aware, we have spoken in terms of the universal class rather than the working class. The universal class is the class of all classes and enforces the idea of the equality of all in a common class. A focus on the working class is entirely appropriate in this context and can be brought to the fore as appropriate.

We need a new perspective on history and a rough outline of the context of revolutionary neo-communism: communism is an innovation arising in the wake of the french revolution (in fact its primordial birth was in the early modern reformation, if not the ancient greek utopians). Our model of history is a simple 'narrative' of epochs in a chronology of civilizations.

Economic systems exist inside and influence but do not fully determine these cultural complexes.

Our framework begins with the crisis of climate change. Homo sapiens is a highly destructive species tending to the destruction of all environments in his wake. The modern industrial system has both revolutionized development and handed the curse of environmental scofflaw destruction to this species man. Unrestricted free markets are an emerging calamity.

### **1. The Crisis of Climate**

1.1. The world at two degrees: the crisis of climate forces the issue of regime change: the need for an ecological communism..

2. The failure of capitalism: the failure of capitalism to deal with its generation of climate calamity shows that self-regulating markets are a myth

3. The classic formulations of marxism are entirely apt but we must restate/update the issues and disengage from the legacies of bolshevism, etc... We tend to eschew theories in favor of empirical histories and practical metaprogramming: praxis. There is no simple solution to the problems of economic, historical and evolutionary theories and we need to operate with a set of experimental procedures. Our historical perspective allows a 'dialectic of teleological judgment' in the estimation of history.

4. We must state in advance what system we propose as a successor to capitalist dominated politics: we can derive the idea of the Commons from a categorical imperative in a Kantian republic of ends. We can propose post-capitalism as a crisis intervention in a catastrophe and ideological hypnosis, and the action of free agents able to refound a new economic order on the basis of a new set of values. We can cite in passing the marxist theory of the stages of production leading from the feudal to the communist stage, but our framework is larger than this classic and brittle theory: we consider instead the action of freely creating a new form of economy to deal with crisis.

5. We must both transcend and fulfill the liberal tradition, that is, the result must have a democratic core. The 'end of history' debate was bogus but had a point: the progression of epochs in history shows a definite process beyond mechanics toward the realization of freedom, thence democracy.

The goal of postcapitalist logic must be to establish a true democracy free of the domination of capital powers. Democracy is more than the rights of capital and is founded in the shared ecology of the Commons.

## **2. History and Evolution**

2.1 The marxist theory of historical materialism is a teleological theory of history and puts excessive emphasis on economic determinism. We can propose an empirical outline of world history as a substitute and create a chronology of history since the Neolithic with an extension to the evolutionary emergence of man. In the process we can refound Marx's early objections to darwinism. Our view of history can point to a useful sketch of a path to a real evolutionary theory even as it remains agnostic as to theory and yet aware of the fact of evolution. This approach can free thinking from the social darwinist curse that has used evolutionary darwinism for social darwinist exploitations and class warfare.

Our new model of history will automatically resolve this issue with a lightweight alternative to darwinian pseudo-science.

2.2 We see world history as a progression of epochs (we can also propose a very specific model of historical evolution to highlight this), of which modernity is the most recent: we see a transition to a new epoch, and the age period that follows. This can help to create a framework of the secular in a new and broader sense and free debates from materialism/idealism dead ends. In the modern case we see the early modern and its immense generation of innovations, with a possible explanation, and a debriefing of Eurocentric questions. This is followed by the onset of a new age period in the nineteenth century. This analysis has a remarkable property: the end of the transitional period around 1800 shows a kind of divide as the character of the historical dynamic changes. We need no hard conclusions about this but it is significant that to a long view capitalism and communism emerge together. It was clear from the start that a successor to capitalism would move in parallel and then overtake the chaotic economic system at the starting point. It is no accident that Marx and Engels appear at this point with a proposal for the new era of economic modernity.

2.3 The basic outline clearly delineates a immense spectrum of emergent properties from the Reformation to the Enlightenment. The sudden appearance of so many innovation near the divide point is not accident. We

see that revolution in the early modern is a strong element in the change of epochs, but we can also see that revolution in the post-divide period will have a different character: the early modern shows a dynamical spontaneity to revolution, while the wake after the divide will require explicit free agency, a point instinctively understood by Marx/Engels who tried to create explicit protocols of revolution, a very difficult task, but one realizable by careful analysis of the steps to a revolutionary transformation. Ironically, however, 'revolutions of free agency' have a higher degree of freedom than dynamical revolutions (which show their historically chaotic character). This elusive set of insights can be taken as reference to our historical model. The point for us here is very simple: we must not apply theories to social constructions. Instead as free agents we must apply praxis, or practical recipes of 'how to' in order to create in freedom a constitutional construct. Our model, we should note, is designed to allow 'theories' only for the past looking backward: the free agent never sees dynamics in the present. This strange model is hard to understand and isn't needed to proceed save to note that we dare not wait for a system to evolve to a new state. Our action as free agents is based on an analysis of the failure of capitalism and the need as free agents to create a new successor.

2.4 As noted the industrial revolution and capitalism emerge very rapidly near the divide point of the modern transition. In tandem emerges a series of chase plane successors and this are crisis vehicles for a system that is unstable on its way to globalization. Within a mere two centuries we can already see that capitalism is likely to destroy planetary civilization without intervention.

2.5 The year 1848 is in many ways symbolic as the starting point of a new era of world history: its classic revolutions were the first to respond to the emerging dilemma of capitalism and show the first appearance of socialist alternatives. This prophetic moment sets the tone for the new world of bourgeois society as an unstable first stage of modernity.

### **3. Democratic Market Neo-communism**

3.1 The issue of capitalism is beset with an immense amount of sophisticated pseudo-science and the twin confusions of classical and neo-classical economics have confused all parties that they don't know what they are



doing. Our historical model allows us to contain this confusion with a simple strategy: no economic model using the calculus of differential equations can be valid for human society because the element of free agency distorts any causal line of outcome. This technicality is decisive and allows us to escape the completely misleading implications of fake economic theories which ape the methods of physics in a preposterous fantasy. There is only one way to deal with economies: apply axioms as free agents to produce constructs to be evaluated in practice. That's the bottom line. The attempts to found capitalism in theory is thus misleading. The reality we see now is the danger of unrestricted free markets and the severe threat of human extinction in a system out of control.

3.2 The question of markets is very tricky nonetheless and the early marxists were not prepared for the so-called economic calculation debate. But that debate seems less cogent now. With no solid economic theory no claims for the inevitability of markets can retain their validity as dogma. The left soon produced a series answers, here which in turn have been criticized, and now in the period of computational machines and artificial intelligence the planning at any level of economies is foreseeable. Overall the fact remains that planning and market socialisms look as though they had been shown up in practice by a superior capitalism of markets. For a generation after the era of bolshevism that seemed convincing but the reality check since induced shows that while socialist economies may be inefficient capitalism is going to be fatal. We MUST asap find a postcapitalist set of alternatives. In any case our framework allows a transitional or else permanent phase where markets exist inside a communist framework. This is not the same as 'market socialism' with its liabilities and many debates.

We need a functional system that can allow survival in a climate catastrophe. The experience of bolshevism was misleading and isn't really a demonstration of anything, but in a crisis it shows that botched planning is still a viable economic possibility. We can do much better than that. We must start from scratch and find a new way to do economics, with simple praxis (or what Popper called piecemeal social engineering) as the bottom line. We design a socialist system to satisfy certain social, ethical, and human requirements. Alienation in a frankenstein created by us is the obsolete muddle of capitalism. We found economics in the values of equality, populist economics rights, and a stance prepared on issues like basic income, AI and the evolution of labor forces, cooperatives, unions, etc... Our approach is

not completely beyond markets in any case, so this sophistical debate over planning is out of date. We respond that it is madness to dogmatize about the efficiency of markets if they decimate the Amazon to produce hamburger mania in couch potatoes in the American television culture. The notion of the end of history decreeing the inevitability of market craziness. The whole debate needs to be torn up as we start from scratch. The second world war shows that planned economies can be constructed in a manner of months if circumstances demand it.

3.3 We have considered then a hybrid we call democratic market neo-communism, described in the endnote. We envision a three sector system with both planning, markets and semi-anarchist/autonomous sectors, a carefully balanced set of opposites

3.4 Let us envision, with the question of revolution as a sword of Damocles, a peaceful electoral transition to the new system envisioned, unrealistic or not. The factor of revolution will not go away and is the critically dangerous transition, one that must produce some form of democracy. The failure of the Russian Revolution here was clear, but it was in many ways the result of Tsarist social mechanics with no experience of democracy and the classic Civil War whose outcome induce totalitarian mania from which the revolution could not recover. But the American revolution shows the correct set of stages: an imperial revolt, and then a constitutional phase. The latter is the point at which democracy must be founded in the context of the democratization of private property in the Commons. No democracy is possible in a system of plunder where commons resources are privatized by predatory capitalist powers (so-called primitive accumulation). In a communist system with many likely antagonists a balanced system of strong authority must guard the revolution, but it must be matched with a strong set of individual rights, and economic populist must be the foundation for a new socially broadened form of democracy that is more than voting for a few neoliberal posters, etc..

3.5 Last and First Men: the transition to postcapitalism is an operation on an immense scale and invokes the level of evolution itself...We must bring our perspective to the level of terraforming, ecological Gaian perspectives, and a secular equivalent of religion. We can adjourn this discussion to the materials in *Last and First Men, Out of Revolution, The Crisis of Modernity*. (Amazon, web pdf)... The blog *Darwiniana* has many discussions here, and

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# APPENDIX

## 1848+: THEORY, IDEOLOGY, AND REVOLUTION

Note: the term 1848+ refers to a periodization method in *World History and the Eonic Effect* and refers to the progression of a new period from a starting point, here the end of the modern transition: it indicates the onset of a new era in world history, modernity...The revolutions of 1848 were prophetic and pointed to the whole question of the future of liberalism.

### **Introduction**

We introduced only the simplest historical framework for our manifestos, one that indirectly referenced a new form of historical analysis. Here we can introduce a lightweight version of that model as an optional backup for our references to the epoch of modernity. Set it aside if it becomes confusing. Our point is merely that we can provide a coherent world history on demand to buttress our assertions about revolutions, modernity and the parallel emergence of capitalism/communism: we can see that multiple outcomes are possible in a system beyond a certain threshold of complexity. That communism would become a potential successor to capitalism is the original sense of the ‘end of history’ and the sophisticated way this was turned upside down has produced a very confused and dangerous situation. Whatever we think of communism it is a pernicious distortion to claim humanity must

be forever subjected to markets because of something Hegel said (in fact he never used the term 'end of history').

We have suggested the danger of theories, and this framework might seem like another theory. In fact, it is merely a sketch using simple periodization of a possible new approach to world history. It is offered as a suggestion for getting a bird's eye view of world history. And it can put economic, Hegelian, Kantian and reductionist historicisms in context. It embodies the idea that complex structure combine dynamism with free agency, viz. a deterministic computer and an input mouse. This dual system is very different from classical mechanics but it is essential for any practical historical framework. Our model is merely a advisory at this point, but it can be taken in rough terms as a demonstration that history has a dynamic, in tandem with free agents, and this impinges on our ideas of evolution.

It is controversial to challenge darwinism but recently biologists themselves have to started to question random evolution. We adopt Marx's initial skepticism about natural selection, brilliant man that he was a hundred years and more before the current onset of a paradigm on evolution. A very simple post-darwinian view of evolution is easy to arrive at if we don't fall into the trap of bad theories: evolution is a visible fact in deep time! We are done. The mechanism of evolution is a far more difficult issue and natural selection has repeatedly been shown to fail the test. Again no hard theory is needed and we can advise (what all biologists do in practice): recount empirical histories of evolution in deep time. This strategy is the same for our historical framework. Can we really use the term 'evolution'? Certainly. The term can be used for any developmental process.

### Notes

It is useful to expand the study of marxism and its canon to a larger study of world history, one that can assist in the cultural project for a postcapitalist era. Here we have a distinctive model that can easily form a superset of the model of historical materialism of the classic work of Marx. This can be useful for the larger study of cultural futures to be sought by critics of capitalist globalization. Here we can explore the mysterious 'discrete freedom sequence' behind the emergence of freedom in the democratic sense. And this can accompany a larger study of the early modern with its discovery of communism in a figure such as Munzer. This short netbook will be presented as is with notes and other resources, and this can accompany the analysis of *Last and First Men*.

If we examine the brilliant onset of the legacy of Marx/Engels we see the limits of its age of reaction against Hegelianism and its school. But the tide of positivism and its fundamentalist materialism ill-served the successors to Marx and his associate Engels who produced the controversial canon of dialectical materialism. Here the enigma of the 'end of history' bedevils all attempts at clarification. The emergence of the term 'democracy', *demokratia*, has a suspicious resemblance to that of socialism/communism: if it means 'rule by the people' we are close to wondering if this isn't strangely resonant of 'rule by the proletariat' and ask how the two diverged. The three forms shown by history are the Athenian, the liberal representative, and socialist participatory democracy. The question of the 'end of history' begins a remarkable change in the suits of 'good guy/bad guy' in the age of global warming and neoliberal mania.<sup>1</sup>

The great question of the modern left is the status of liberalism and the gestation of a postliberalism as communism or socialism. But from the start the dilemma of a radical break with liberal ideas versus a realization of democracy in a communist context has confounded the left's attempts to create a revolutionary, and, more, a postrevolutionary solution to the enigma of a stable postcapitalism. The issue need not be so arcane, despite the routine of Hegelian sophistications, or sophistries, applied to a vaunted 'end of history'. One problem is the way that such figures as Lenin had taken to a near revulsion of liberalism, and this in the context of the even more hated despotism of the Tsars. The revolutionaries of the period were unable to bring the elements of the bourgeois revolution of 1917 to the final result which ended in the horrors of Stalinism. The reality of the Civil War made any open system an unrealizable dream.

The question of revolution in the early modern is one of the mysteries of modernity itself, and requires a new perspective on history for its understanding. The attempt on the left to match revolution with a dialectical dynamism is not satisfactory from the view of science, but it does bring home the idea of rapid versus slow evolution. Another misleading idea is that of punctuated equilibrium which has introduced the notions of slow and fast evolution into leftist/marxist discourse. A better framework is needed.

*Last and First Men* shows how the model of the so-called 'macro' effect illuminates the rise of 'secular' modernity.

The basic issues and concepts are:

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<sup>1</sup> Brain Roper, *The History of Democracy: A Marxist Interpretation*, Pluto, 2013, p. 1

the relationship of history and evolution: a deduction  
 the sequence of transitions and relative beginnings  
 a distinction between historical determination and free agents  
 a useful metaphor of 'stream and sequence', or directionality  
 a frontier effect that shows why the sequence jumps around....

The result, a portrait of directionality via a series of transitions is called the 'eonic' effect, and/or the 'macro' effect.

This bypasses the idea of the dialectic, and subsumes the concept of punctuated equilibrium in a form that is empirically clear (without using the terminology).

The perspective, from which this derives, in the analysis of *World History and the Eonic Effect* can help to see how the factor of discontinuous 'fast' revolution emerges in the modern transition, and this without a speculative theory. Instead we can simply use the 'macro' outline to see that this issue is resolved via periodization. We don't need abstruse theories of revolution. We see by inspection of history that modern revolution is associated with a larger dynamic and that its place in the emergence of democracy is crucial

In the context of this model the rise of modernity itself shows a rapid transitional structure in relation to overall world history. And this is connected with the perception of the Axial Age in proximate antiquity and thence to a series of 'axis' points in a speculative hypothesis of a system in a frequency pattern. This model can be taken on provision, or set aside and replaced with a simple outline of world history which suggests a progression of epochs, with the rise of modernity suggesting the onset of a new era in this context. As we develop this model we discover the way it actually matches the data and starts to show us some surprising insights, confirmed empirically.

The idea of a finite transition model implies an endpoint for a finite transitional interval and we can see that this property is clearly reflected in world history. And this is the point at which the classic left visible in marxism starts its venture! This timing is not chance. The point around 1800 into the early part of the nineteenth century is in this 'divide' interval and this gives a new perspective on the generation of Marx/Engels: they are placed just at the start of a new era, with roots in the transition, but looking to the future. This is very apt and shows the way the revolutionary context of modernity produces a prophecy of a last revolution in the future. This synchronous emergentism of capitalism as we know it now and its prophesied successor is a perspective brought out by the new type of model we propose.

The issue of revolutionary dynamics has asked for explication from theories of punctuated equilibrium, the dialectic, and much else. But in terms of our model of history, the solution is to look at patterns of history and study the issue empirically. Then we see that the modern transitional reinvents the 'revolution' and this is clustered throughout modernity.

This short 'netbook' contains a short version of the issues of World History and the Eonic Effect and of Last and First Men. It will also be a bibliographical extensions discussing many of the books that never made it into LFM.

In the process we can consider the place of Marx/Engels and their successors in the era of the early nineteenth century. A set of ideas can be used as a path to practical realizations in a putative new party, The Red Fortyeight Group, in the context of a neo-communism and its associated socialism.

### **A short online netbook from [eonic-effect.net/2008](http://eonic-effect.net/2008)**

One of the unexpected successes of the eonic model is the way it highlights the rise of modernity in the context of an historical dynamic, visible in the eonic effect. This model allows us to harmonize the ideas of history and evolution, and mediate the contradiction between random and teleological conceptions applied to history. The discovery of historical directionality where least expected is a by-product of eonic periodization, and the result is the depiction of the modern transition, and just as important, its 'Great Divide', or the point at which the modern transition terminates and yields to the new age of modernity as such. This property of a discrete-continuous model, its finite interval transformations in a series, finds a surprising confirmation in the facts of modern history, the extraordinary period of innovation that we see at the end of the eighteenth century. The model distinguishes carefully between the so-called macro and micro levels of the eonic sequence, and this, applied to the modern transition and its aftermath, suddenly uncovers the enigma of modernity in its often confusing and seemingly contradictory aspects: after the divide period the action

changes its character from macro to micro. The transitional interval from ca. 1500 to 1800, from the Reformation to the Enlightenment, is climaxed by the generation of the French, American, and Industrial Revolutions, and a host of other so-called 'eonic emergents', and the result is a spectacular take-off point, the generation leading up to the period of the transformed mid-nineteenth century world of liberal/bourgeois civilization. That these events in a massive cluster from ca. 1750 to 1850, the Great Divide, are an aspect of the 'non-random (eonic) evolution' of civilization is, at first, surprising, and a strange way to analyze both history and modernity, but the match of the model to the facts is so striking that we gradually begin to get a sense of a tremendously subtle and deep system at work, one that resolves the chronic confusions of historical determinism and free history that have bedeviled all efforts to construct universal histories. Even if one found the eonic model a bit odd it would be worth one's while to get this kind of analysis under one's belt, because this kind of systems analysis, however outlandish at first, uncovers something less organized approaches would miss completely.

The appendix of *World History And The Eonic Effect* constructs a periodization database using a special terminology, and in this context the term '1848+' is simply one way of referring to the Great Divide period, or rather its immediate aftermath, clearly visible in the generation of the 1840's and after. This period is, ironically, the theatre of one of the classic failed revolutions, that of 1848, but one that left a mysterious question mark, and thus the 1848+ glyph is a topical notation serving to force a question on us: how should we take the phenomenon of revolution, and ideology, in the context of the eonic model. More generally we should look at the whole outcome of the modern transition in its many dimensions and the way the nineteenth century comes to floodtide at the onset of globalization. The generation of the 48's shows a host of other parallel incidents of interest, but we can focus on the moment of emergent Marxism at the conclusion to the modern transition.

Actually, while most so-called scientific approaches to history attempt to ape the objectivity of the hard sciences even as they end in ideological bias, the eonic model makes no pretense to transcend ideology, doing ideology wholesale, and keeps itself honest by forcing the issue of looking at the full spectrum of ideologies. The Axial Age alone shows us a multiplicity of differing perspectives and views on a stupefying scale, each hard to fully understand without a full-scale scholarly expedition. Thus we (can optionally



as an exercise of post-eonic analysis) actively reconstruct the classic collision of liberal and post-liberal ideologies as this occurred instantly in the wake of the French Revolution, hoping to find some tactic of reconciliation between them, and some resolution of the immense tragedy emerging from leftist promotion of revolutionary adventurism. We should note at once, without conservative or reactionary bias, that the eonic model puts a high premium on basic liberalism as an eonic emergent process, and the reason for this is that it correlates exactly with the eonic structure, and cascades with the coming of the multiple democratic revolutions that proceeded in parallel to the leftist ‘deviations’ attempting spastically to both fulfill them and overcome them. Marx or no Marx, the liberal revolutions outstripped their far leftist competitors, for reasons not hard to uncover, given a little eonic study. Liberal emergentism has solid roots in the seventeenth century, and crystallizes rapidly in the so-called Great Divide. That said, there is nothing mysterious in the basic impulse of the nineteenth century left: democracy means just that, how to bring ‘real democracy’ into existence? Thus the rise of the left is simply an aspect of one and the same liberal revolution, a point often lost in the fractious dialectic it generated. By the time this impulse reaches the throes of Leninism the point has been lost totally, and the basics of liberal emergentism look to have been right from the beginning. The basic problem is that while the eonic sequence looks to be ‘revolutionary’ indeed, the series of eonic transitions are not the same as ‘revolutions’, which are particular historical episodes that occur in the context of eonic transformation, but don’t represent its essential dynamics. Thus the spectre of teleological revolutionism arose as a fallacy of eonic dynamics, and the result was a misconception of the case at hand.

Of essential interest is the now classic set of antitheses that emerge between the liberal and later leftist, especially Marxist, perspectives. It was Marx who first clearly outlined the issues of theory and ideology, in the context of revolutionary transformation and its dilemmas. And yet something has always seemed ‘not right’ about Marxist theory and the tremendous surging emergence of liberal civilization was never properly analyzed or resolved in the tenets of the suddenly-itself-an-ideology: the Marxist interpretation of historical dynamics.

The eonic model forces a kind of ‘recompute’ on these questions, since it makes a strong, and finally much better, claim on historical

theory than the heavy-footed ‘historical materialism’, whose analyses have never been successful in their theoretical claims, what to say of their fallacious attempts to rationalize the phenomenon of revolution, witness the fiasco of the Bolshevik revolution and its aftermath.

The eonic model, it must be admitted, with whatever bias, gives a much sounder analysis of so-called ‘bourgeois modernity’, but perhaps risks the danger of itself being ideological in this respect. In fact, the model is so comprehensive that it can table contradictions with ease, and its intent is reconstructive study, not ideological promotion. But the leftist rejection of bourgeois capitalism led to the rejection, in some respects, of the whole phenomenon of modernity itself, in the confusion of economic and cultural categories, thus ending in a kind of proto-postmodern muddle of trying to undo the very culture it was trying to promote. The crux of the confusion lies in the mis-analysis of the French Revolution, and the so-called ‘economic interpretation of history’ applied to the dynamics of capitalism. The irony here is that by putting the prime emphasis on economic dynamics the Marxist left ended by strengthening the very process it attempted to critique. Whatever else is the case, and beyond the phantoms of theory, the left, the issue of revolution apart, provided an answer to the deficit of democracy in its successful practical realization of nineteenth century labor movements attempting to redress the imbalance not only in bourgeois democracy but in the whole history of exploitation visible since the emergence of the first states at the dawn of civilization. A world-historical first.

The eonic model approaches the whole question of the failed theses of historical materialism with a different construct and in a much simpler and more intuitive fashion, by distinguishing economic ‘evolution’ from the greater ‘evolution’ of culture, and demotes capitalism to economics, even as it promotes the more general phase of modernity to the level of a kind of macrohistorical dynamic. Demoting capitalism to ‘mere economics’ shouldn’t be a controversial step! Cats belong in the feline category, nowhere else. And yet the mystique of capitalism seems to have bemused the Marxist to the point that universal history is seen as the product of economic interactions, and this is simply a fallacy.

One of the great ironies of modern thought is the way that economic ideology came to influence biological theory, even as Marx was developing a critique of just such ideological confusion. As a final confusion, the left itself ended by embracing Darwinism, blunting the cogency of its assessment of the impact of economic ideology on culture. Part of the reason for this lies in the Feuerbachian agenda of secularist Marxism, and the challenge it brings to the reactionary character of religion. But as the history of Darwinism shows this secularist strain of modern thought has not produced a truly adequate understanding of the issues of religion.

As we examine the capitalist revolution in the context of the eonic effect we can see the rightness in Marx's instinctive sense, based for example on his thinking about Ricardo, that theories were adopting the stance of science even as they expressed a kind of bias about the systems they purported to analyze. The insight that Marx was groping toward arises all over again in the eonic model, but in a different way, and almost automatically from the way that model distinguishes the modern transformation from the elements, or 'eonic emergents', that constitute its action. Thus the Industrial Revolution becomes a characteristic emergent timed to the transition itself, but it is not itself open to equation with that process, save perhaps that it stole the show. It is a set of technical processes matched with a set of ideas about how economies should function. All well and good, but the theoretical component of some economic determinism is off the mark here in a way the eonic model compensates for on the spot with its distinction of 'system action' and 'free action'. An economic system is thus not a pure system following some set of differential equations, but a dual combination of agents making economic policies and the system that arises from those decisions. The evidence is clear: a set of policies comes into existence to express market dynamics as a reform of policy, and from there a kind of bubble world of economic consequences comes to the fore as a world in itself, to which all are subject, soon with the claim that this is the 'way things are, and so must be'. That's the gist, or one way of stating Marx's challenge to ideology. That such a system is actually the creation of the agents themselves, or those agents in control of capital, is long forgotten in the stance of 'alienation' that arises.

In the eonic model the functioning of economic systems is segregated from the more general flux of eonic emergents, and it focuses directly on the moment that agents of philosophy bring to the point of system

creation: Adam Smith is the all time classic example. This is expressed in the phrase econostream != eonic sequence in the material of eonic model. The appearance of Adam Smith is, or tokens, one of the classic emergent strains of the modern period, but the realization of his thinking becomes a dominant discourse on its own terms in a way that throws the diversified dialectic of modernist thought into an imbalance of economic philosophies whose potential cannot be generalized to the expression of universal histories. Suffice it to say, the thinking of Adam Smith becomes distorted as a kind of fetish of theory and is soon a format for 'reality dogmatism', claims about the way things are, and hence must be.

It is remarkable to note how this ideological flu is catching, and it seems to enter the stage of biological theory formation just in the generation of Darwin's production of his theory. Another component to this crystallizing set of fallacies springs from Malthus, and the debate over his ideas (even as his demographic contributions prove seminal abstractions in the creation of demographic science) had from the beginning an ideological focus.

The resulting theory of natural selection produced by Wallace and Darwin both proved a disguised version of this Smithian/Malthusian legacy, and the resemblance of selectionist theory to the strain of mantra-chanting on the subject of economic competition seems no accident. The fallacy arises from the failure to actually observe evolutionary dynamics in action. It is one thing to discover evolution as a set of facts, quite another to fully observe its dynamics, and here the Malthusian surface of the survival of the fittest scenes directly observed by naturalists, Wallace in his jungles, Darwin in his Galapagos, is actually misleading. They are observing 'evolution' of a sort, but never the real dynamics of evolution as such. This point is forever unclear until we actually produce an example of evolutionary dynamics, at which point the vast complexity of its real action can be observed as if for the first time.

In any case, the resemblance of Smithian to Darwinian thinking is striking, down to the obsessive treatments of ethics seen in the almost willful attempts to promote 'selfishness' isms as the basis for evolutionary ethics, the reductionist scenarios essentially voiding ethical action as they ground altruism, for example, in a trick reversal of selectionist reasoning. A true tour de force of ideology, one they got away with because, just as Marx might have predicted, they made it look like science. The

subtle trashing of altruism and the subtle promotion of selfishness, a qualitative switch so desirable for those promoting capitalist participation, is one of the most dangerous legacies of Darwinism, thence of the legacy of Adam Smith, whose thinking was not intended by him for these outcomes. To fritter away the immense potential of modernity on these mathematicized card tricks of scientism puts a whole civilization at risk, and Marx and his contemporaries in timely fashion sound the first warning.

### 1.2 A Revolution Of The Ages

The preoccupation of the nineteenth century left was the issue of revolution, and especially the ambiguous outcome of the French Revolution. The question of counterrevolution and the sense of the 'revolution manque' that arose in the wake of the French explosion generated what we know of as the modern 'far left'. The acute sense of the dynamics of class that haunted first the French, then the later July and '48 eruptions are what led Marx to his classic analyses of class struggle. The aftershocks of the French Revolution are strewn across the nineteenth century and we see especially in the generation of Marx the emergence of a 'diagnosis' of the outcome of modern revolutionary democracy in terms of an analysis of the class polarization of the new political systems attempting to be born, as often stillborn, beside the instant success of the relatively isolated American Revolution that had set the tone for the emergence of the wave of democratization associated with the Great Divide.

The point for us is to stand back and look at the modern transition itself, from the sixteenth century to the Enlightenment as the 'revolutionary' transformation it essentially was, without becoming fixated on the incidents of revolution themselves. If we do this we see that the Marxist analysis tends to miss the larger dynamics of modernism, which encompasses not only a remarkable string of actual revolutions, but an entire transformation of culture that is far larger than the politics of revolution as such. The explosion of the Reformation, its synchronous companion, the German social revolution of 1615, the English Civil War, long precede, yet clearly prophecy what is to come in the American and French Revolutions.

The point for us is that the sense of a new era in history that so animates Marxist thought, and not only Marxist thought, is confirmed by the evidence given in the spectacle of the rise of modernity itself, at a level deeper than

the incidents of actual revolution. This 'revolution of the ages' comprises much more than the confusing and contingent circumstance of the French Revolution, whose dynamics induced a schematism of thought leading to the fallacies of revolutionary adventurism. This schematism resulted in the dubious, if not fallacious, view that the explosive drama of revolution constituted the prima face evidence of historical dynamics, and that therefore the controlled induction of revolutions according to script would constitute a realization of that dynamic. Unfortunately, as the Bolshevik revolution shows, this line of thinking contains somewhere a set of false assumptions. The suddenly appearing ideology of revolution has been the object of multiple critiques, some of them quite cogent, others too ideologically biased to grasp the real issues. But the simplest first conclusion of our differing analysis would be to note that in one way Marx and his fellows got it right, in one way: the modern transition produced a spectrum of bourgeois economic societies, struggling toward democracy, at which point, and here Marxists tend to have gotten it wrong, the transition impetus waned and the system in question lapsed into a strange kind of equilibrium not easily induced to further revolutionary change. The false analysis of Fukuyama and his sausage of Hegel unwittingly gave expression to this view, in another way. This is the stuck in gear 'bourgeois world' of the Marxist critique. The problem here, and prolonged study of the eonic effect might bring the point home, is simple: there is no logical prohibition on revolution, but in practice no such venture can mimic the spectacular scale of the modern transition itself, whose emergentist character is almost mysterious in its depth. It seems so broad that in fact it is a poor description to reduce it to the categorization of 'bourgeois society'. The result of the modern transformation includes religious transformations, the rise of science, a definite set of philosophic innovations, and a broad cultural flowering encompassing all fields, including the artistic. The later left ended thus in a condition of jackknifing exception to the civilization coming into existence, thus condemning itself to bucking the larger momentum of modernity with an ambitious hope to produce an artificial course correction applied to that momentum. Marxists often said as much, in their own language, and their ambivalence toward the outcome of modernity is fairly well recorded in their literature. It is small wonder that the collision proved disastrous in its failure to grapple with the phenomenon it thought it had understood in purely economic terms. This then is the problem with revolutions: it is true that revolutions correlate with modernity, but they don't define it. To construct a new 'new society', a new

variant of modernity, just after a new society has just come into existence creates a collision of modernity with itself. And the logistics of social change required to do that are so far beyond the means of a cadre of revolutionaries as to constitute a practical, if not logical, fallacy. That is obvious if we look at the artificiality of Bolshevism: a group of agents who had lost perspective on what they were doing, and had an instant confrontation with a series of 'black boxes', social complexes hard to even describe let alone modify, whose correct grasp is not easy even for hordes of scientifically trained sociologists, what to say of 'movement enthusiasts' too often armed with little more than a set of eclectic clichés of social theory. And yet the mystery remains that the modern transformation does show clear evidence of the sudden (over several centuries, and relative to the scale of world history) transformation over this total spectrum of culture that revolutionaries observed after the fact but couldn't replicate. So, at least, it is not true necessarily that notions of 'revolution' are to be replaced by notions of 'slow evolutionary change'. It is simply that we don't understand and can't replicate what we see as the natural process of history, so far. The simplest resolution of all this would have been (and Marx all too often sensed this point himself) to have ridden the momentum of the bourgeois emergentism with a practical effort to produce a better version of democracy after the fashion of the cascade of such. In fact, a close look shows that this was essentially the real meaning of the whole 'socialist' conception, as this arose as a version of the attempt to define the term 'democracy', so recently reborn, and too swiftly compromised by the complexities of class dynamics, to the point that in the view of leftist hotheads the whole outcome was flawed or inadequate, or dominated by what turned out to be the prodigious momentum of the capitalist sideshow, soon the main event. Here Marx was a victim of his own Hegelian brilliance, with his classic critique of the doctrine of Right. That famous turning point in the Hegelian aftermath issued a challenge to the fundamentals of democratic constructivism in its experimental phases. But the point was lost that without a system of rights, the first born of the political transformation of modernity, all subsequent experiments in social tinkering were going to be orphans of the democratic emergentism of the whole transition. Here the later left, à la Marx, entered uncharted terrain, with the disastrous results we see in the contemptuous and totally eviscerating versions propounded by Leninists, whereby the great and historic victories of 'right' were discarded in the stages of the socialist parody.

The issue thus is posed: what is the modern transition, and how are we to understand it in larger terms against the backdrop of world history? For that we need to extend our analysis by looking at the whole evolution of civilization as such by moving backwards, there to find the first of a series of 'revolutions of the ages', the so-called Axial Age period.

None of this is a rejection of the idea of revolution, as such, however perilous such thinking now vitiated by false concepts, and the chronic and somehow terminally confused debate such as we see in the Second Internationale over the question, the Bernsteins vs the Leninists. Lest we lose perspective and take sides too easily in that prolonged fracas, they both seemed right and wrong at once, let us recall that the American Revolution was just that, a revolution, and that its success lay in its ability to reprogram something from scratch after a revolutionary interruption of continuity. How they brought it off remains one of the mysteries of world history, highlighted by its eonic bull's eye timing at the Great Divide, even as the facts are recorded in a transparent chronicle, but one thing is clear: they didn't waste time on theories. Their devices were practical nostrums of constructivist republicanism. What we see later is the concoctions of scientism concocted by cadres suffering Hegelian brain damage resulting in a tragicomedy of agents who had no idea of what they were doing. These tragedies of theory spring from the loss of a sense of universal history and the failure to grapple the idea of freedom in relation to those orphans of science we call (social) theories.

### 1.3 The Eonic Effect

Here we can connect our discussion with the larger issue of the eonic effect, and the historical dynamics discovered behind the emergence of civilization since the Neolithic. The core discovery here is of the so-called Axial Age, the phenomenon of synchronous emergentism we see in classical antiquity, including the five, or more, parallel emergentist zones of cultural transformation stretching across Eurasia. Here the Marxist theory of history confronts a wild exception to the claims of purely economic interpretations of the evolution of culture. In fact, we see prime examples of the transformational process connected with the broadest issues of culture, from religion to the political, from the philosophical to



the aesthetic. The full description of the Axial period has been described in these blogbooks from several different aspects. Here we might note that Marx had a sense, which he misconceived, of a progression of ages, e.g. in his conception of the stage of development from feudalism to capitalism. The problem with his analysis is that the 'stage' of modernity does not exactly match the passage from feudalism to capitalism. Modernity is not described exactly as the 'stage' of capitalism, and the incidence of feudal situations is far-flung, that is, it appears, and recurs, at many times and places, throwing some doubt on the 'stage' aspect of its appearance.

In fact, as the example of Axial period shows, we find a pure 'stage' of something that is independent of its economic arrangements. The enigma of the Axial Age resolves itself into the need for a larger generalization, since its uniqueness as a period, indeed, a stage, suggests that it is only one in a series. With that insight we rapidly solve the puzzle of 'stages' as we move backwards and forwards from the Axial interval, suddenly to discover that a series of Axial intervals, the birth of civilization (so-called), the Axial period proper, and the rise of modernity, fall into a sequential pattern of emergent acceleration. We have the clue to the rise of the modern, and an equal clue to where the Marxist analysis is off the mark. Our stages are real, as temporal phases of acceleration, but have no intrinsic content, or defining label. That is, there is one field of civilization, or Civilization differentiated as 'civilizations' (it comes to the same thing), and the stages are an 'intensification' of their inherent processes, cultural, religious, political. We must examine the content transformed in each case empirically. All at once, the simplicity of the situation is brought home by the comprehensive nature and visibility of this set of transitions, dubbed the 'eonic sequence'. The puzzle of capitalism confused with modernity clarifies at once. The economic stream, already semi-capitalist, enters the transitional zone and period interval, and we see a correlated transformation we call the 'industrial revolution', and the onset of modern capitalism. The revolutionary transformation of economic systems that we see in the modern transition has been confused with the transition itself. In fact, the question of capitalism has no intrinsic connection to modernity, for the very simple reason that it is present, in primitive forms, across the whole of history in the form of 'market behaviors' and 'market systems' (always present whatever the state of social interventionism cast out by the very late Adam Smith). Thus the issue of Marx can be simply restated very simply as a challenge to the question of markets and human rights, in the emergence of laissez-faire systems in the

context of overall modernity. Nothing could be simpler in principle, nor as vexacious in practice, since the triggering process is one thing, the outcome highly rooted in its own circumstance, and not easily changed. The need to differentiate economic systems from the 'eonic system' lies in the fact that markets are omnipresent, and spread to all places at all times, while the eonic sequence is a localized intermittent sequence of isolated effects.

But in essence the point is clear, as noted already: as the forms of economic development emerge across world history, their actuality is independent of the eonic sequence itself, and thus require the deliberation of economic reasoning in each context where they occur. The notion of 'free markets' is thus an abstraction of later theorists who attempt to apply a canon of policy concepts to the prior stream of semi-capitalist perhaps semi-mercantilist or 'what have you' behaviors. All this means is that the outcome as capitalism that we see in modern times is distinct from the stage of modernity itself, logically speaking, notwithstanding its center-stage claim on the title of modern social systems.

The question of theory then suddenly jumps to a new and different mode: that of the progression of accelerations or transitions so mysteriously present along a selective mainline of universal cultural history.

It seems as if, so far from being a stage of history, the capitalist phase of modern history is a relatively contingent aspect of that modernity, suddenly amplified in the process of modernization and technological discovery, but not in and of itself an intrinsic stage of anything. We have simply restated a Marxist thesis in another form: we are not required to posit an inevitable stage of economic existence on the grounds that is connected to the larger eonic sequence of emerging civilization. There may be solid grounds for embracing a capitalist brand of economic organization, but that is not the point. There is no inherent historical inevitability to its appearance. And in fact its appearance is actually a relatively arbitrary set of variants decided on by historically given agents, often ideological agents at heart. There is hardly any way around this fact. Would we define modernity in terms of one capitalist system, as opposed to any number of easily conceived variants? What are we talking about?

It is almost as if Marx had been saying: we see the modern transition suddenly frozen in place and left incomplete as it is captured by the forms of a particular stage of 'capitalist' economic formation. There must be a completed

form of modernity itself that is realizable as post-capitalist. That may be true or not, but we can see that the basic point is clear: the dynamics of world history we have found is compatible with multiple alternate forms of economic organization. Especially important to grasp is that the self-organization, so-called, visible in economic prosperity generation is a sui generis process. It only explains itself, and is not the right rubric of explanation/theory required to understand the larger dynamics of Civilization. Once we become familiar with this kind of analysis the point is almost obvious. And yet versions of the notion of economic self-organization have tended to sow tares across the board in all areas of social analysis, indeed, including the biological, notably the brand of evolutionism that emerged from the Darwinian phase. The idea, seen a figure such as Hayek, that social institutions in the manner of 'self-organization' in relation to economic systems, is certainly false. The evolution of social organizations springs from many sources, the generative action of the eonic sequence claiming by far the largest component of that action. And its relationship to economic systems is not intrinsic.

#### 1.4 The Riddle Of Evolution

One episode of the ideological drama of Marxism lay in its reckoning with the coming of Darwinism, especially in the formulations of Engels. Marxists seemed to think that while Darwinism gave an account of biological evolution, Marxism was better equipped to deal with the cultural. In fact, we have already seen the inadequacy of both approaches, and what is more we have discovered a form of historical dynamics on such a vast scale that its implications force us to reckon with the scale of general evolution itself. Thus, the sense of leftist thinkers that they were grappling with evolution in some way is confirmed and yet we can see that a different formulation, such as we see in the eonic analysis, in fact foots the bill much better. We have essentially found one key to the dynamics of civilizations and their economies, and in the process, to what is at first our sense of puzzlement, we come to the realization that what we have found must impinge on the riddle of human evolution as such. We can hardly take Darwinian oversimplifications seriously if we have found 'evolution' in history itself, with a suspicion that what we see in some form that we do not yet understand must apply to the earlier stages of human evolution. That is to say, some form of 'macro' dynamics ought to have been present from the earliest phases of human emergence. We don't need to jump to conclusions here, but what we can

say is that the misapplication of Darwinism to history is exposed for what it is, a kind of ideological manipulation of something we see to be far more complex. The relationship of evolution to history requires the mediation of a new kind of historical model, and this can help us to put the fallacies, not of Adam Smith, who was an honest economist, but of his biological successors, into context as inadequate to either historical or evolutionary theory.

### 1.5 An Eonic Model

Here we can inject a reference to the eonic model, as this formalizes in an elegant, and ultimately very simple, way the basic facts of the eonic effect, as a series of three (or more ) transitions in a mainline called the eonic sequence. The model arises from a clear examination of the Axial Age and the requirements for an adequate analysis of its enigma. The resolution lies in the formulation of the idea of an eonic sequence, whose set of transitions, or accelerations, demands two levels of analysis. We derive the model from an interesting question: when did evolution stop and history begin? The answer to this paradox is that no instantaneous transition would be possible, instead nature would demand a Transition between the two. We can apply the same logic to that Transition: would one such transition do the job? No, in fact we see the form of the Transition would be a series of such transitions in a series in which the balance of evolutionary and history aspects would shift their mix. Most remarkably that is what we see in the eonic effect, and the result is a model on two levels, the macro and the micro. The macro shows 'high level' determination, and the micro is the realization aspect in its wake. This gives us a rough model of the Axial, and other, 'axial', transitions.

This analysis on two levels resolves at a stroke the confusions of the Axial period: we see the macro effect in the sudden eruption of effects, the micro aspect in the actual way each transitional area undergoes realization in a differentiated spectrum. The hopeless muddle of the Old Testament clarifies, since we can see the braided macro and micro effects. The Axial component, as pure timing, indicates the macro, the actual form of the Old Testament myth representing the micro. That the Old Testament is a micro description of a macro process its observers did not properly understand at once clarifies the historical result we see.

In general the clearest picture of the process is to be had from its best

documented instance, the Archaic/Classical phase of the Greek Axial interval, surely the most spectacular moment of civilizational acceleration given to us by historiography and archaeology. The diversity of the whole Axial spectrum requires emphasis. Two religions are born, in Israel, and India, a whole series of philosophical, political, artistic, and other innovations, appear as if like clockwork, and then the process subsides and goes into steady state, more or less. Our next realization is that the clue to the whole has fallen into our lap and we extend this analysis, using the discrete-continuous interpretation, to a plain vanilla cyclical analysis based on a sequence of transitions: the birth of civilization (actually the point of the emergence of Sumer and Dynastic Egypt), the Axial interval as such, and the suddenly emergent modernity we see as the modern transition. The idea of a model can allow us to realize, and get use to, such an outlandish, at first, form of analysis, by formalizing on a 'take it or leave it' basis: that is, we can simply try this approach as formal modeling, until such time as its basic rightness begins to sink in.

A considerable list of accessory concepts is required here, and we might note two: the idea of a frontier effect, and the idea of relative transforms, or the 'stream and sequence' concept. Our eonic sequence follows a simple logic: that of globalization, eonic globalization, and we see that our eonic sequence at each stage is moving to a new frontier zone of realization, in the oikoumene field of its prior manifestation. This resolves the puzzle of the sudden 'restart' in a minor Canaanite area on the boundaries of the Sumerian/Egyptian fields. This effect is essential for understanding the rise of modernity with its European polarization, and vulnerability to Eurocentric confusions, which are destined to be transient side effects of the larger eonic sequence, which proceeds independently of the individual civilizations it touches. The question of relative transforms is essential logic needed to grasp the way in which two levels operate in tandem. We see that the Axial interval seems to generate, e.g. monotheism, while at one and the same time 'monotheism' existed, or was developing, prior to the Axial interval. This non-puzzle is instantly clarified by a version of a discrete-continuous model, in which we take the 'stream' of culture, or cultures, on one level, and the overlaid 'sequence' effect of the larger macro process together as two aspects of a master system. The rough elegance of this systematic braiding of the evolutionary and the historical is first seen in its prodigious glory in the earlier, especially Axial, periods, and gives a new perspective on the rise of the modern: it is a transition in a series,

follows the logic of frontier effects, and shows one and the same 'stream and sequence' overlay found in the other cases. This macro and micro aspect of the modern transition, with the consequent devolution to micro in the wake of the Great Divide, followed by the phase of globalization, allows us to see together the confusion of liberal and post-liberal systems that we have discussed from the start. It is very disconcerting to Eurocentric fans of the modern transition to watch this globalization of their transient localization start its prodigious globalization, almost like clockwork, in the wake of the eonic sequence. The timely appearance of the types such as Karl Marx is thus seen for what it is. Their ambivalence toward the basic liberal emergentism is suddenly understandable, and yet ominous in its potential for deviation from the suddenly crystallized version of the mainline.

The relationship of localization, as a set of transitions in the eonic sequence, and their contribution and subsequent globalization in a set of oikoumenes or diffusion fields, and globalization, is the most confusing aspect of the eonic effect (the modern transition is not a question of Europe!), and yet once mapped out the process is remarkably simple. And in that context we can come to an understanding of the emergent left of the nineteenth century. It is almost uncanny to see how a remorphing of liberalism, a prime emergent process of the modern transition, moves to respond to the process of economic globalization. Nothing in our eonic model says anything about what occurs outside of its mainline. Thus the moment of the divide, the termination of the eonic action, is open to deviation and chaotification, and the substitution of quite different processes for the general direction set by the eonic interval. This issue particularly clarifies the ambiguity of the globalization era of the modern post-transition, at once an active diffusionism of modernist elements, and a protest against Eurocentrism and imperialistic economism. The timely appearance of an agency of globalization, visible in the Marxist response to modernity and globalizing economism, is almost miraculous and the undoubted reason for the mystique of the left, whatever the confusions of its ideological crystallization.

But eonic analysis pushes us at once to compensate for the inadequacies of Marxist thinking. We should extend our analysis to the broadest categories, e.g. an idea of the 'eonic left', or the transformational character of the whole eonic series, beginning with the emergence of civilizations and states and the dramas and spectacles of equalization visible in the action of the eonic

effect. Here the basic emphasis of the left shows its eonic character, but one shifted to the phase of globalization, hence with a sudden potential for direct opposition to the very transition that has generated the whole new era.

We have the clue to the spastic dialectic of the nineteenth century left. It is picture perfect in one way, and completely disorganized in another. It appears promptly to ride the wave of globalization, equalization, and de-Eurocentricization, as a 'helper' process in the degenerations of the post-transition. What might help (we hardly dare to pontificate) is a broader sense of the historical context of civilizations, diffusion fields, globalization(s), and religions, along with a closer look at the emergent character of the democratic revolution. Such a left could be at once a fulfilment and a critique of 'bourgeois modernity', and be aware of its limits in the difficult effort to restage 'modernities' in the diffusion field arising after the Great Divide. Otherwise we should feel condemned to the sudden deviations from the general character of the modern transition, rather than to the fulfilment of its basic action. .

These remarks are very general. But they show the context of the paradox of the democratic revolution spawning its own antagonist so swiftly in the wake of the modern transition, and the need to thoroughly grasp the concealed eonic character of the modern democratic wave, thus correcting the too frequent blindness of the left to the nature of its own task, so perfectly in place, yet frittered away in confused theoretical formations unnecessary to that basic task.

Most of all our model is a reminder of the treacherous nature of teleological thinking. Our model gives us a handle on teleological thinking applied to history, even as it severely disciplines any such thinking with a reminder that teleological ideologies are not going to get it straight. The directionality seen in the eonic sequence gives a gift of insight into teleology even as it confiscates such a notion to a higher level, one that political movements in time cannot control. Their task is the realization of the basic tasks of the moment: the eonic emergentism set by the arising processes appearing in the wake of the transition's divide.

## 2. Modernity: Out of Revolution The rise of the modern

### 2.1 A Great Transformation

We have enough to proceed, but let's start over, as it were, and go over the rise of the modern again very quickly in light of our depiction of the eonic model, to see the way that Marxism emerges very late in the process, after the Great Divide, with what is probably the first glimpse of the eonic effect, but one distorted by its wrong focus on economism, yet animated by the very democratic revolution that it ended by challenging. We can proceed with a series of stepping stone references to the phases of modernity, and then adjourn to a blog-like context, a blog perhaps, to review in more detail the elements seen in our bird's eye view.

Our context is that of the modern transition as the 'great transformation', and this in the context of the eonic sequence, a 'next axial interval', so to speak, with its characteristic frontier effect, three century duration, divide, and aftermath. This frontier effect is completely insidious and bedevils all efforts at clarity as the red herring of Eurocentrism enters to confound what is a stage of globalization, eonic globalization, we must note at once. The localization via a narrow spectrum in a partition created by the Reformation, stretching along a band comprising, roughly, the brief Italian, then the German, Dutch, English, thence French, Spanish, etc, transition zones, confounds easy analysis as hopeless confusion emerges about 'European Western Civilization'. Crediting this 'frontier effect' seems an indulgence in the fantastic, and an uphill struggle of understanding unless we see its greater logic and the way it banishes all confusions, seen rightly. Localization and instant globalization are the elegant if rambunctious result. The spectrum of effects comprises, to be brief, the Protestant Reformation, the German social revolution, thence the rise of modern science, the phase liberal emergentism seen in the English Civil War, the sidewinder emergence of the North American system, suddenly triggered at the Great Divide as a parallel emergence zone (the first of the diffusion field offspring). The Enlightenment, Romantic reaction, great divide, and democratic and industrial revolutions cascade at the climax in a confusing interplay that can't be understood if they are too easily scrambled together as a causal series (the industrial revolution didn't cause democracy, or vice versa). We have independent emergentist processes compressed in a field of manifestation. We see that the modern transition in one of its climaxes in the earthquake of the French Revolution, but it should be noted that our transitions are 'shotgun' in their action, and the apparent failure of the French



revolutionary instance might blind us to the overall success of the transition in generating a remarkable string of democratic revolutions, whose natural tendency toward equalization generates the action of radicalizing leftisms.

We have the spectacle of the discrete freedom sequence, in the larger eonic context: the realization that the periodization of democratic emergence is not random, but follows eonic logic. This demands a partition into macro and micro analyses, and the fact must be faced that the burden of realization will, and must, end in the field of the post-transition, the micro field. This rapid downshifting must be understood in any attempt to analyze the outcome of the modern transition and certainly the coming left(s). The danger of sudden appearance of idiocy squared is a liability of such a process, and more generally the integrated transformational character of the transition is not given to what follows in its wake. Subsequent movements might therefore be subject to the limitations of dialectical confusion and deviation from unknown or invisible premises latent in the larger action of the eonic sequence.

We might note in this regard that the fruits of the transition produce very quickly something not present in the transition itself, the rewriting of modernity as an economic civilization in the phase of industrial capitalism. All well and good, but the restriction of a larger potential is, significantly, protested at once by the remnants of the French Revolutionary left, remorphing rapidly into challengers of that first born outcome of the modern transition.

1848 does indeed seem to be a critical moment as the flood tide of the modernist post-transition gets underway in the coming of globalization.

## 2.2 Revolutions Per Second

We can restate our point: the modern transformation climaxes in the phase of the Enlightenment, which overflows into the period of the French Revolution, even as the Industrial Revolution, so-called, accompanies the passage into a new form of civilization, one soon dominated by the action of capitalist agents, an outcome intimated perhaps, but not legitimated, by the implications of our transition. The point is merely that this realization is seeded in the field of the macro but realizable only in the field of the micro, the reason for its ambiguous character.

The point to see here is that while the thrust of the modern transition is indeed revolutionary we could not easily mimic its action in a revolutionary gesture. The breadth of the transformation is beyond the simple action of revolutionary elites. This does not mean that it is therefore illegitimate or impossible, only that the result must show an understanding of what real historical evolution is about, and that is hard indeed.

Our transition produces an almost idyllic set of liberal breakthroughs, and then lapses into inaction after the Great Divide. The realization of that potential is left to the free field of micro action.

Let's keep going...

### 2.3 Discrete Freedom Sequence

It can help to stand back and notice something extraordinary: in terms of our eonic sequence, the tide of democratic revolution, appearing at the Great Divide, is the second instance of this effect, visible in the emergence of democracy in the earlier phase of our eonic sequence. The spooky nature of this timing is something that defies easy understanding, but is a reminder that the name of the game is democratic freedom. Any leftist counterrevolution against that great experiment is likely to deviate at once from the eonic impetus. A point to keep clear in the subsequent chaotifications of bolshevism. And the reason many of the oddly conservatizing agents of the bourgeois sphere make themselves hoarse with libertarian denunciations of the deviated marxisms flooding the globalization sphere.

There we have it: the field of leftist globalization is prone, for theoretical reasons suddenly apparent, to deviations from what would seem (but haven't necessarily been so derived as) eonic teleological projections. Note that teleology is a property of the macro system, hence unknown to us, but as sheer guesswork we can see that its projections from the transition interval of democratic emergentism is somehow the 'name of the game'. Deviate from that at your own risk.

The prodigious emergence of the American sidewinder in the wake of the transition, exploding at the great divide, outflanks any of the humble

efforts of the left trying to concoct outlandish fragments of democracy and socialism, while the first-born of the democratic revolution in America proceeds to such success that its fate could be to become the victim of that success as a degenerated imperialistic power thwarting the opportunities of subsequent globalization. Fair or not, the charge is soon so leveled.

It is important to see that this exemplar is not solely a democratic revolution, but a colonial rebellion that exploits its opportunity to stage a democracy. A point to keep in mind as the overwhelming momentum of this creature of the modern divide starts to find the spastic left barking at its heels. The attempts, thence failures, of democratic induction in the micro field, produce contradictory results, collapsing as crypto-capitalist imperialist conspiracies, and require understanding the reversal from macro to micro in the wake of the transition, and should remind the left of the left that the Bolshevik tragedy is both proof of their theoretical inadequacy, yet a reminder as it is packed off to the catacombs to stew over its inadequacies that a mideonic left is needed to challenge the imperial degenerations of the democratic revolution.

#### 2.4 Class Struggles

The basic critique of Marx, and others of the generation of the 1840's (a context in which Marxist thought is instantly understandable), of the issue of democracy and class is suddenly transparent in our analysis: the democratic revolution seemed destined to become sluggishly imbalanced in the struggle toward equalization, and this is compounded by the class implications of the capitalist revolution. Much of the Marxist analysis is cogently adaptable as a plug-in component to our eonic post-transitional analysis, save only that the issue of the industrial proletariat is open to re-analysis as an abstraction invoking a macro dynamics that isn't there. That is, the action of the proletariat is not the same as the action of the eonic sequence, although nothing in our analysis prevents it from becoming so in the future. Marx's formulation is another one of those bon ideas whose future realizations remain unknown and as yet unrealized. That free individuals should graduate to control their eonic destiny at the putative 'end of the eonic sequence' is an adventure yet to happen, one fraught with both logical inevitability and considerable peril as to the outcome. We can table Marx's idea then as a question about the end of the eonic sequence, and the danger of its cooptation still another time by elite subclasses of State

domination, etc.. In a nutshell, Marx's idea is a first draft of something still to be realized. The Bolshevik revolution doesn't rate much mention on that score.

The basic action of the eonic sequence is that of state formation, counter state formation (and religion formation), i.e. equalization (the revolution of the state, the revolution against the state), followed by...anarchy?

Our analysis doesn't predict the future here.

### 2.5 Historical Inevitabilities

We should conclude this chapter with two citations relevant to the discussion: the critique of historical inevitability, and the question of the Hegelian 'end of history'.

The charges against Marxist theory found classic formats in the critiques of Isaiah Berlin and Karl Popper as to historical inevitability and historicism, respectively. A tendency toward deterministic analysis haunted marxist theories with the confused result we see in the wake of the Second Internationale and the Bolshevik episode: should agents stand back passively to allow the unfolding from teleological premises or should they actively work to bring about the result. This confused situation is a symptom of an inadequate theory and a false teleological projection against events. We can see that the eonic model more adequately reanalyzes this situation as the interplay of two levels. The only teleological anything we could glimpse here is that of the democratic revolution, and this is forced into the distinction of macro and micro phases. There is thus no teleological projection of a socialist future that is safe for us to endorse. The more likely result is simply a series of mal-formed experiments attempting to blend incoherent elements. This is not an argument against socialism, only a reminder that such a project would need to be constructivist as a gesture of free men. Historical inevitability thinking based on an undefined abstraction called 'socialism' distracted Marxist from the need to think practically about what they intended.

The distinction in our model between system action and free action suggests the nature of the problem confronting rigid theories. The result is simply, men become free to do as they please, but unless they can produce a democratic system, whether socialist or not, their efforts are likely to

produce unstable results. We can't resolve this question fully, save to note that a careful study of the American revolution and subsequent democracy formation shows all the elements needed for the creation of a socialist democracy as a practical gesture of innovative politics. But we must consider that, for whatever reason, the success of this classic gesture put the emphasis on the formation of a republic first and foremost. Without a republican basis, a socialist gesture is going to end in the wreckage of a totalitarian resolution. Thus look closely at the stage of republican experimentations to find the lost vitamins of socialist theory, even as the class basis of much that is visible in the American experiment begins to stand out. Remorphable potential outcomes suggest themselves without limit, and free us of the Leninist temptation to forego this real complexity of democratic realization.

As to the 'end of history' question, we will refer the reader to the treatment in the text of *World History And The Eonic Effect*, noting that Hegel's and Fukuyama's version are hardly the same. The point for us is that our model suggests a much simpler rendering of the question, indeed the question, Have we reached the 'end of the eonic sequence'? If so the potential of free action in the wake of a prodigious system is open to the dangers and difficulties of free realizations that misinterpret the eonic sequence.

As to Hegel's idea, it is obvious that he seems to sense the eonic effect, and its 'freedom generation', and wishes to give a teleological basis for that. In our version, we see that the effort to maintain the achievements of democracy during the entry to the micro phase of the post-transition require understanding that the emergence of freedom has a macro aspect that is evolutionary, and that micro deviations from that will fritter away the gains of time in a new mediavalism. We thus echo Hegel's point: there's no going back. Unfortunately, we must realize that the brief emergence of Greek democracy was all too brief, and the action of mideonic elements is not controlled by the eonic sequence. Thus the vigilance required to stay on course, a vigilance present up to a point in the leftist discourse, but all too obvious itself subject to the post-transitional chaotification of the mainline induction.

### 3. 1848+: Ends and Beginnings

#### 3.1 End Of Eonic Sequence?

We can conclude our brief tour by laying down a few more rubrics of discussion, in the process connecting our discussion to the question of evolution.

We have already raised the issue of the Hegelian 'end of history', replacing that with a different analysis of our own. What Hegel was talking about is not always clear. In our version, the issues are crystal clear, without presuming to predict anything about a long range future we cannot control.

In our version we are left with a spectacle, looking backward, of an immense evolutionary process, the eonic sequence, whose character is both mysterious and yet transparent in its effects.

Here's the paradox: as we come to an awareness of this process we must suspect that its action will subside, not just in the near future, but for good. We have no final grounds for such a prediction, but we can see that the implications of our model are those of an 'evolution of freedom' and that its macro aspect must at some point subside and leave the field to the self-evolution as the self-realization of freedom of those men who have passed through its action. This puts a premium on the final autonomy and free action in the formal analysis so elegantly provided by the eonic pattern, and our model. That leaves a rather open-ended discussion, as it should, and also tokens the ominous possibility that the gains of freedom can be lost in the recurrence of history's curse, the domination of narrow elites. We see an eonic logic to the emergence of freedom and this historical data shows us the best of arguments against those who will stage the reactionary gestures so obvious from history of those whose ambitions are inadequate to the future potential of man.

### 3.2 A Liberal World

Our analysis has shown the eonic roots of the liberal emergentist world that arises with such momentum in the nineteenth century. We have produced without trying something leftists scorn, a theoretical legitimation of a political system in terms of an argument of historical dynamics. But, since we did it without trying, there might be something to it, and at least the result might be free of some bias for being a side effect of an analysis that began with the Pharaohs and passed through

the multiple universes of the Axial Age. Our eonic sequence produces a series of self-enclosed worlds, and the liberal nexus seems to be another of them. Relative to the ages past, it can, and should, be seen as an immense achievement, and proof of some evolutionary claim of progress.

That a group of leftist hotheads saw fit to bicker over the result almost before it came into existence shows perhaps the justice in dialectics, and the claim one must grant that the eonic sequence having produced one world is potentially the source of an infinity of others. But at least we should consider that the replication of the action of the eonic sequence is a task not likely to succeed with eclectic innovations of theory. We see a world whose elements require thorough mastery and that in the larger context of world history as a whole.

Our eonic model is thus completely open to multiple perspectives on such questions and even opens a folder called 'TP4 exceptions', or the analysis, which the reader can pursue in the text of *World History And The Eonic Effect*, of general mideonic start up formations, whether these fulfill or deviate in our estimation from the eonic sequence. This involves among other tasks the study of the great religions and also the consideration, so deftly muzzled in the propaganda of that Hegelian rascal Fukuyama, of the, yes, Zoroastrian thunders latent in our eonic analysis. The beginnings we see in the eonic effect demand, if only by a process of logical inevitability, the query, woefully metaphysical, about the 'ends of things', thence the ministrations of mad prophets as to the 'end times'. To unsettle our quaintly foundationalist analysis of a liberal world with the pronouncements of the once and future Zarathustras is proper suspense in a tale left unfinished, but perhaps Fukuyama had a point. We can see that in a discrete-continuous system that outcomes tend to stabilize and endure, save only that that stabilization at its initial point could be flawed from the start, inducing the obsession to redo the beginnings that we see in the Marxist Zarathustras.

We have to leave it there for the moment, having granted ample latitude for both, or many, perspectives, having achieved what any Marxist needs to have achieved, a basic clarification of liberalism in action, a gesture certainly present, most unclearly, in the famous manifesto of Marx.

We should note in passing the structural resemblance of the left of the left to the situation spawned in the wake of the Axial Age, wherein

the parallel emergentism of the Judaic and Greco-Roman transitions induced a collision of the two and a highly ambiguous 'revolution against Rome' resulting in a theocratic statism of equivocal status.

Anyone in the leftist catacomb would do well to ponder this outcome in all possible aspects, humble to the finitude of human aspiration dressed up in Zoroastrian finery confronted with the probable outcomes in frozen medievalism.

### 3.3 Rational The Real

Our analysis has passed quietly through that mysterious land first charted by the philosopher Hegel, but with a different model and result. We should pause to consider for a moment the legacy of that great figure and take note of the well-known history of the left on this issue, and the great confusion over Hegel that arose in Marxist theoretical gestures. That generation of Hegelianism, we should note, clusters near our Great Divide, and thus we can be sure, if not in theory, in a sort of 'eonic hunch', that it will prove important and recurring, whatever the verdict of transient scientism on its metaphysically outlandish demeanor. Fukuyama is proof of that. How on earth did a concoction of Hegelianism sneak its way back into the political discourse in an age of hard science and regimented scientism. How did he manage it?

Our eonic model can easily answer the question, and is robust enough to easily either 'sublate' and/or bypass the ruminations of Hegel, but we must insist that we have produced an historical analysis that stands on its own terms and borrows nothing from Hegelian dialectics, showing rather a Kantian emphasis on the issues of so-called transcendental idealism. Our solid model is thus potentially superior in practice to the dangerous gamble with dialectic that animated Hegel and haunted his followers. The question must be left to further research.

We need not come to any final decision on these issues, save to warn that the eonic sequence doesn't resolve as a dialectical process. And we should caution that the degenerations of dialectic in the promotion of revolution are one of the least rigorous, in fact, shallowest corners of Marxist theory. Our model enforces a discipline that a revolutionary might dislike: it grants no legitimation for future revolutionary trials as



deterministic or teleological outcomes in theory, restricting such ventures to what they should be, the actions of free men, and no doubt hare-brained men, destined to miscalculate their situations. That said, with ominous precision, the eonic sequence generates not only a liberal world, but a potential failsafe protocol in the outcome of mideonic confusion.

As to Hegel, it is hard to compete with the momentum and reputation of this classic, but we might note that our eonic model reissues the discourse that bedeviled Hegel, his discussion of the rational as the real, a pronouncement he lived to regret as his leftist followers proceeded to find the actual slightly less than rational.

Our eonic model resummons this issue in another terminology, without Hegel's faux pas, by making its gist an issue of two levels. And indeed in the eonic sequence we see the way in which the ideal and the 'real' can intersect, leaving us with a sense of the rationality of history quite compatible with an evaluation of its irrationality.

So we can peddle our wares confident in a robust upgrade of Hegelian thinking on the mysteries of Reason in History.

### 3.4 From Kant To Feuerbach

Hegel can be a confusing thinker unless seen in the context of German classical philosophy as a whole. Then the appearance of Kant (and Rousseau) at the moment of the great divide stands out as the equal generator of leftist considerations. We have but to consider the implications of Kant's ethical deliberations on the categorical imperative in the sense of a 'kingdoms of ends' to find that stolid Protestant devotion a drastic revolutionary by the force of unwitting logic alone. In any case, his system of transcendental idealism is the right starting point for discussions of the enigma of the eonic effect and its operation on different levels of action. And unmatched is Kant's formulation of the riddle of human freedom in the context of Newtonian causal scientism. The subsequent episodes of Hegelianism are hard pressed to transcend the problems indicated in that starting point. Whatever the case, the rough and ready match of Newtonian foundations to a projected discourse on the noumenal character of freedom in relation

to its temporal manifestation finds in the eonic model a match of dynamics to the facts that should lead us to reconsider the gyrations between idealism and materialism that tear apart the generation of the socialist birth which ends with the Marxist embrace of an inadequate Feuerbachian termination of Hegelianism. Kant is the classic liberal at his most classic and echoes a logic of republicanism that will surface in perfect concert at the Great Divide. Kant is also a reminder that the fate of modernity is bound up in the need to complete or transcend the initial phase of the Protestant Reformation, whose structural position in the modern transition gives it a sturdiness that will rival anything the left might hope to produce as it is allied with the late decay of modernist philosophy into technological scientism. Hegel well understood this crucial positioning of the Protest Reformation, and its fulfillment in philosophical modernism is a fitting endgame to the convulsion of Axial religions confronting the modern transition. That the Reformation finds one completion in the wake of Hegel and another in the brilliant recasting of ancient sutras in Schopenhauer and still another in the wake of the left is a useful insight into the integrated nature of the modern transition, and we might consider the Kantian deliberations on the issues of ‘religion in the light of reason’ and see that its cascading exemplars must include the almost religious character of the arising left, bequeathed the tasks of equalization so evident in the momentum of the Axial religions, soon to become theocratic churches coopting the basic thrust of religion formation with the religious ideologies of elite statism.

### 3.5 Last and First Men

We should conclude fast here, with a connection indicated to the idea of evolution, this time an idea of evolution quite different from that of Darwin, or for that matter that of Nietzsche, whose denunciation of the last man, that creature we have momentarily established rather as an eonic agent, the stolid bourgeois type about his business in the post-transition.

In fact, we have left this creature to his mideonic fate as our analysis jumps to a different level of macrohistory, indeed, nothing less than macroevolution.

Our connection between history and evolution can be pursued in additional blogbook series of this type, but the point for us here is that we have potentially

reconciled the idea of evolution and history in a way that ironically wishes to redefine the irony latent in the scoffing Nietzsche's mockery of the 'last man'.

For us the relativity of first and last men can be seen in the transposition of the idea to that of the first and last of the apes, man, in the evolution of homo sapiens. We tend to focus on the early generation of history in the wake of some putative earlier evolution of man. But in our formulation the 'evolution' of man is on-going, reaching even into the present and future of civilization, with the counter-evolution of history from that evolution indicated in the relationship of the eonic sequence to the emerging self-consciousness of those destined to be left to their self-evolution.

So perhaps Nietzsche had a point, to wit, that man is destined to something more than the stabilization as a type in an economic fixation of bourgeois existence. Sounds like Marx. The human creature can or should or must in the end generate the true first from the last man, or better, the last man, evolved from the first. In the nonce the confusions of Nietzsche over the nature of the overman, perhaps as some Darwinian supermonster, are to be reminded of the considerations of those who got it right the first time, starting with Rousseau, who pointed to the necessity of equalization in the context of decayed nightmares called 'civilization', and the way in which our eonic sequence gives expression to that different concept of evolution seen in the evolution of freedom, a far cry from the degenerated fiasco of theory visible in the scientism of Darwinism, which so misled the genius of Nietzsche.

### Conclusion

We have completed, or else begun, our consideration of the place of the classic left in relation to the eonic history generated by the eonic sequence, hopefully in the process showing both the significance, and yet limits, of conventional leftist (usually Marxist) discourse. In a way we need a dose of someone like Marx to properly evaluate our eonic sequence, for a simple reason: our model in general speaks of the 'eonic observer' attempting, despite his immersion in the history he wishes to recount, attempting to discover and describe the eonic effect, and this requires more than just the realization of the outcome of the modern transition, but more the amplification of self-consciousness to an objectivity about the circumstances of that sudden mechanization of outcomes in the wake of the greater action

of the macro level. Notable is the sluggish undertow that we see in the sudden conservatizing of the realizations of modern freedom in the ideology of classical liberalism, no doubt due to the sudden gigantism of the grafting of capitalism onto liberalism. This realization might not do justice to the full potential of the transition, thence the demands from the left of critique. Here the attempt to both analyze and realize the outcomes of revolutionary modernity find their expression in the figures of the age of Marx's youth, in the confusions of the revolutions 1848. We can't exclude this consideration, even as we avail ourselves of a truly potent model for the explication of liberal emergentism. We have a true powerhouse of theory at our fingertips, but it comes with a price, that of a balanced assessment of the totality of modernist emergentism, and beyond that of the greater eonic sequence constituting evolutionary Civilization in the throes now of post-transitional globalization.

Although the radical Marxist left can be seen via the basic matrix of eonic periodization as post-transitional operatives, they arise just at the boundary between the transition of macro to micro action and remain of intrinsic interest, and not just historically. Lest this be a designation of 'Johnny come latelies' we should demand a thorough study of first moments in the modern transition, and not just that of Lutheran Reformers, those prophetic anticipations of the bourgeoisie, but of Thomas Munzer, that Zoroastrian hothead about the business of class struggle, at the dawn of modernity. We are left with the endgame, and a Marxist question, did the modern transition fulfill its potential? Did the gestures toward the equalization of the whole result in a success, or, as with the fate of the Munzer himself, end in the restoration of the dominant classes? We have but to compare the English Civil War with the 'revolution' of 1688 to consider the difference and a possibly ominous answer to our question. In perfect symmetry, figures such as Munzer at the start and Marx and Engels at the end, induce a mysterious echo effect, and we should come to the conclusion with that question raised at the beginning, which leaves us with a need to challenge our depiction of evolutionary emergentism with its own implications, the possible deficit of macro and micro action.















